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Sex, Drugs, Pregnancy, and the Law:
Rethinking the Problems of Pregnant




The way in which a story is told inevitably shapes a listener's re-
sponse to it, summoning and ordering emotions so that they settle like a
halo around the flame of a candle that is the truth as seen by the story-
teller. I remember my first response to the story of Pamela Rae Stewart.
Journalists wrote of a woman who defied her doctor's advice to refrain
from sexual intercourse during the last weeks of her troubled pregnancy.1
When she was thirty-nine weeks pregnant, she had sexual intercourse
and immediately began to hemorrhage. She then waited hours before
reporting to a hospital.
Shortly after her arrival at the hospital, her baby was born with mul-
tiple handicaps. Two weeks later, the baby died. Reading the stories, I
felt angry and disgusted by Ms. Stewart's irresponsibility, bitter about
her child's wasted life, and while I did not applaud the decision to prose-
cute her,2 I certainly empathized with the impulse to punish Ms. Stewart.
* Director of Research and Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Institute for Health
Law, Loyola University School of Law, Chicago. B.A. 1983, Cornell University; M.P.H. 1988,
J.D. 1988, University of Michigan. I wish to thank Sallyanne Payton (first mentor, then
friend, and now and then, mentor again) for all of her assistance. Many friends and colleagues
have provided me with critical input, insight, and support throughout the long gestation of this
Article: Mary Becker, Daniel Goldfarb, Paul Tarini, and Morrison Torrey, as well as the
participants in the Chicago Feminist Law Colloquium and the Feminist Legal Theory Confer-
ence at the University of Wisconsin, Madison. Heartfelt thanks also are due to my research
assistants and friends, Christine Georgevich, Charlotte Richter, and Alan Spellberg.
1. Mike Konon, Data Access to Fetus Case Put on Hold, SAN DIEGO TRIB., Oct. 24,
1986, at Bl, B12.
2. Ms. Stewart was charged with "failing to follow her doctor's advice to stay off her
feet, refrain from sexual intercourse, refrain from taking street drugs, and seek immediate
medical attention if she experienced difficulties with the pregnancy." Konon, supra note I, at
B12. The only illegal act alleged was the use of illegal drugs, which was based on finding a
substance in her blood that could have resulted from an over the counter antihistamine. Id.
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Some time later, I read a second version of the story, one with a
detailed factual background, and I found myself reordering my thoughts
in response to answers it gave to questions I had never even thought to
ask.3 Where was her husband throughout this pregnancy? Didn't he
bear some responsibility for the sexual intercourse they engaged in? And
how many women thirty-nine weeks pregnant actually seek out sexual
intercourse?
This second journalist's version told of Ms. Stewart's life with a vio-
lent, abusive husband, who beat her and regularly threatened her and
other family members. It described how she lived with him in her
mother-in-law's mobile home, along with their two children, dependent
on him for transportation and for the erratic income he brought home
from occasional odd jobs.4 This new, fuller version of the story presented
another writer's "truth," and effectively channelled my emotions so that
I focused not solely on the actor, Ms. Stewart, but also on the context in
which she acted.
Perhaps only Ms. Stewart knows the real truth of what happened to
her on the day she delivered, of how she felt as she was hemorrhaging, of
why she waited to seek care. But from a broader perspective, obtaining
that particular truth is relatively unimportant. A more significant task
for those of us who deal with social and legal policy is to understand the
context in which she lived, because, to the extent that her actions were
responsive to her environment, were inevitable and perhaps even ra-
tional, similar actions will be repeated over and over again by women like
her.
Pamela Rae Stewart's story already is being replayed for us. Week
after week, Americans are bombarded with media coverage of the "cri-
sis" of pregnant addicts.5 The wealth of evidence regarding maternal
3. Angela Bonavoglia, The Ordeal of Pamela Rae Stewart, Ms., Aug. 1987, at 92.
4. Id.
5. See, e.g., Ellen Goodman, Being Pregnant, Addicted: It's a Crime, CH. TRIB., Feb.
11, 1990, at 12; Charles Leerhsen and Elizabeth Schaefer, Pregnancy + Alcohol = Problems,
NEWSWEEK, July 31, 1989, at 57; Andrea Stone, Prosecutors Focus on Drug Use, Pregnancy,
U.S.A. TODAY, Feb. 26, 1990, at 3A; Anastasia Toufexis, Innocent Victims, TIME, May 13,
1991, at 56.
A discussion of women using controlled substances during pregnancy is complicated by
terminology. While the use of certain controlled substances is commonplace and consistent
with societal norms, the line between use and abuse is not well defined. This line becomes still
less clear when the referent is a pregnant woman. Is a pregnant woman who smokes mari-
juana once an abuser while her nonpregnant counterpart is not? Because treatment programs
are the normative response to those who are unable to stop their use of a controlled substance,
I will refer to those needing treatment as "addicts." In general, the term pregnant substance
"user" is intended to include all categories of pregnant women using controlled substances.
[Vol. 43HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
DRUGS, PREGNANCY, AND LAW
and child health conditions6 in the United States has been ignored in
favor of a bizarre and inappropriate obsession with drug use by pregnant
women.7 Integral to this portrayal is the casting of pregnant drug users
as the sole agents of harm to children's health. The mother has become
the fetus' greatest enemy. A recent Time magazine cover story pur-
ported to discuss whether "the innocent legacies of drug use [can] be
rescued by care and compassion." 8 Typically, no attempt is made to de-
scribe the suffering or even the life circumstances of the pregnant addicts;
we are left to devise our own horrific images of the "guilty" victims of
drug use.
The media stands poised at bedsides in delivery rooms across the
nation, reporting shocking numbers of newborns testing positive for ex-
posure to illicit substances. 9 The statistics most frequently cited are that
375,000 newborns per year, 11% of all births, are exposed to cocaine,
marijuana, or heroin in utero.10 These figures, and a growing awareness
of the harm such substances cause to the fetus, 1 have gained national
6. Other than drugs, a woman may encounter any number of serious threats to her and
her child's health. These threats come from many different sources, e.g., tobacco, alcohol,
aspirin, etc. Moreover, many of the risks which women face are beyond the woman's control,
such as exposure to environmental hazards in the workplace. See UAW v. Johnson Controls,
111 S. Ct. 1196, 1199 (1991). More importantly there are contextual factors which will influ-
ence the child's health. These factors include limited access to prenatal care due to financial,
practical, or cultural barriers, unavailability of decent food because the funds for programs
such as the Women, Infants, and Children Food Supplement Program (WIC) have been se-
verely reduced, and lack of adequate shelter and a stable environment. Molly McNulty, Note,
Pregnancy Police: The Health Policy and Legal Implications of Punishing Pregnant Women for
Harm to Their Fetuses, 16 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 277, 293-99 (1988). Thus, there is
a whole constellation of shortcomings in the system about which society should be outraged,
but instead we have seen an increased focus on women who use illicit drugs during pregnancy.
7. The focus on pregnant drug users also seems quite hypocritical considering the fact
that many women use tobacco and alcohol during pregnancy which can be just as harmful to
the fetus, yet society accepts this maternal behavior much more readily.
8. Toufexis, supra note 5, at 1, 3, 56. The cover of this issue of Time proclaimed,
"Crack Kids: Their Mothers Used Drugs, and Now It's the Children Who Suffer."
9. By "illicit substances" I mean those drugs which are commonly considered "con-
trolled substances." According to the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-904
(1988), this includes all opiates, opium derivatives, hallucinogenic substances, depressants,
stimulants and narcotics. Ial § 812(c). Alcohol, wine, malt liquor, and tobacco are not in-
cluded as controlled substances. Id. § 802(6). Because the list encompasses the substances
that most people call "drugs," i.e., cocaine, heroin, and marijuana, the term "drugs" will be
used interchangeably with "controlled substances" or "illicit substances."
10. White House Seeks Policy to Reduce Infant Deaths, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 1989, at
D24.
11. Although researchers readily acknowledge the potential harm inherent in fetal drug
exposure, there is a dearth of precise information about causes and effects. Cocaine can cause
serious effects for the fetus, including strokes, spontaneous abortion, and abruptio placentae
(which necessitates a cesarian section delivery). On average, cocaine exposed newborns have
lower birth weights and smaller head circumferences, both of which may impact infant sur-
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attention and have led some members of society to call for draconian
solutions.
12
Generally, there have been two responses to this issue, both puni-
tive. The overtly punitive response is seen in the criminal prosecution of
pregnant substance users, on charges ranging from delivering drugs to a
minor to manslaughter or assault with a deadly weapon.13 This practice
has been criticized on both legal and policy grounds as being unconstitu-
tionally discriminatory and unlikely to deter substance use by pregnant
addicts. 14 The second response to this problem has been increased vigi-
lance in the enforcement of child abuse and neglect laws against pregnant
users of controlled substances. While ostensibly benign, in the context of
a society rife with inequality such enforcement emerges as a covertly pu-
nitive measure. Charging pregnant substance users with child abuse pe-
nalizes women who use drugs by separating them from their children,
while failing to provide them with access to the means by which they
might regain custody. Because the widescale application of these laws
will affect many more lives than will ever be reached through the crimi-
nal prosecution approach, I have chosen to focus exclusively on the ap-
plication of child abuse and neglect laws to pregnant drug users, and will
vival. They also have a higher incidence of physical abnormalities, including deformed kid-
neys and neural tube defects. They may experience behavioral problems as they mature, such
as irritability and difficulty in bonding. Helene M. Cole, Legal Interventions During Preg-
nancy, 264 JAMA 2663, 2666 (1990).
However, not all exposed infants are affected by cocaine use. Furthermore, some re-
searchers believe that "whatever negative effects occur at birth gradually dissipate and eventu-
ally leave the child unaffected." Susan E. Lockwood, What's Known-and What's Not
Known-About Drug-Exposed Infants, 11 YouTH L. NEWS 15, 16 (1990).
12. One neonatal intensive care unit nurse at Detroit's Hutzel Hospital suggested the
following, "I know it sounds harsh .... but I think we should offer these mothers a week's
supply of free drugs if they would let us take out their uterus [sic]." Tom Hundley, Infants: A
Growing Casualty of the Drug Epidemic, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 16, 1989, § 1, at 1.
13. In Michigan, two separate cases were filed recently against women for delivering co-
caine to their babies through the umbilical cord. Prosecutor Will Continue Cocaine Case, UPI,
June 14, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis library, Wires file; see also Johnson v. Florida, No.
89-1765, 16 Fla. L. Weekly D1053 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. fied Apr. 18, 1991). In Illinois, a
woman was charged with involuntary manslaughter, but not indicted, after her baby daughter
died from the cocaine in her system. Patrick Reardon & Rick Pearson, Baby's Drug Death
Stirs Mothers' Rights Flap, CHI. TaRB., May 10, 1989, § 1, at 1. A woman in North Carolina
was charged with assault with a deadly weapon following her newborn's positive toxicology
test. Jan Hoffman, Pregnant, Addicted--and Guilty?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1990, § 6 (Maga-
zine), at 32-35.
14. McNulty, supra note 6, at 278; see also Robert Batey & Sandra A. Garcia, Prosecution
of the Pregnant Addict: Does the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause Apply?, 27 CRIM. L.
BULL. 99 (1990); Kary Moss, Substance Abuse During Pregnancy, 13 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J.
278 (1990).
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demonstrate in this Article the means by which these laws worsen, rather
than remedy, the problems surrounding perinatal drug use.
My arguments rest on a belief that in order to understand the issue
of perinatal use of controlled substances, one's focus must be shifted from
bedside at delivery to bedside at conception. Given the widespread prev-
alence of drug use in society, the relevant questions are: Why do women
users get pregnant, why do they continue using controlled substances
during pregnancy, and how can they be persuaded to curtail their use
during-and after-pregnancy?
In seeking answers to these questions, I aim to restructure the sto-
ries of pregnant addicts depicted in the media and by the legal system. I
begin my discussion by describing some of the contextual factors that
shape the lives of women who use drugs, and especially of pregnant ad-
dicts. Given that background, I then examine the likely impact of child
abuse and neglect laws on these women and their fetuses. Next, I
demonstrate how present policy violates the Fourteenth Amendment's
equal protection guarantees against gender discrimination. Finally, I of-
fer an alternative approach to addressing the problem-one which I be-
lieve is both legally and practically more cogent, humane, and effective.
H. Situational Overview
The lives of women who use drugs are shaped by a constellation of
factors: psychological, sociological, physiological, and economic. After
examining current statistics on the prevalence of substance use by preg-
nant women, I will explore these factors, first addressing the psychosocial
make-up of pregnant drug users, and second, discussing the dilemmas
posed by lack of access to necessary care.
A. Facts, Figures, and Pregnant Addicts
A recent study of the prevalence of substance use in women report-
ing for their first prenatal examination in Pinellas County, Florida re-
ceived considerable attention from the media. 15 This study, which tested
the women's urine for alcohol, cannabinoids, cocaine, and opiates, re-
vealed that 14.8% of the 715 women tested screened positive.16 In addi-
tion, 13.3% of the tests were positive for illicit drugs other than
alcohol.17 Extrapolated to the population at large, this study indicates
15. Ira J. Chasnoffet al., The Prevalence of Illicit Drug or Alcohol Use During Pregnancy
and Discrepancies in Mandatory Reporting in Pinellas County, Florida, 322 NEw ENG. J. MED.
1202 (1990) [hereinafter Chasnoff et al., Illicit Drug Use].
16. Id. at 1203.
17. Id. at 1203-04.
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that approximately 375,000 newborns per year are exposed to controlled
substances in utero.18
The Pinellas County study is significant for several reasons. First,
its results parallel the findings of the National Institute on Drug Abuse's
1985 household survey, which estimated that of the fifty-six million
American women between fifteen and forty-four years of age, 15% are
currently "substance abusers." 19 Additionally, the 1985 survey found
that use of controlled substances among women of reproductive age did
not vary with socioeconomic status.2 0 The Pinellas County study repli-
cated this finding by drawing its sample from public and private paying
patients, and showing that drug use did not vary with income.
21
Second, the study reveals, in an indirect manner, the racism and
sexism which underlie the societal response to this issue. When compar-
ing toxicology screens across racial lines, white women tested positive at
slightly higher rates than black women.22  Yet, despite relatively equal
rates of drug use, black women are nearly ten times more likely than
white women to be reported to state agencies for substance use during
pregnancy.
23
While black and poor women more frequently use drugs that may
cause greater harm both to themselves and to their fetuses,24 this factor
neither accounts for nor justifies the reporting differential. None of the
reporting laws passed in response to this problem differentiate among the
various illicit substances; there is no discretion given to health care prov-
iders and others mandated to report. Thus, marijuana users should not
be treated differently than cocaine users. The underlying premise of the
nondiscretionary reporting policy is the assumption that state child pro-
tection agencies, rather than individuals, are best qualified to ascertain
whether a parent's drug use poses a risk to the child's well being. There-
fore, the relatively equal extent of drug use among black and white wo-
18. See id. Some studies have recorded much higher rates of positive toxicology screens
in newborns. For example, a 1989 survey at Hutzel Hospital in Detroit revealed that 42.7% of
all newborns tested positive for marijuana, heroin, or cocaine. Hundley, supra note 12, at 1.
19. Edgar H. Adams et al., Epidemiology of Substance Abuse Including Alcohol and Ciga-
rette Smoking, 562 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. Sci. 14, 15 (1989).
20. Chasnoff et al., Illicit Drug Use, supra note 15, at 1204.
21. Id. at 1203.
22. Id. at 1204. Black women tested positive for cocaine more frequently than did whites
(7.5% black compared to 1.8% white), while the opposite was true for marijuana (6.0% black
compared to 14.4% white). Id.
23. Id.
24. See supra note 22; see also PADDY S. COOK ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES, ALCOHOL, TOBACCO AND OTHER DRUGS MAY HARM THE UNBORN
(1990).
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 43
men should generate equal numbers of reports to state agencies. The fact
that the numbers are nowhere close to equal is evidence of race bias in
reporting.
The problem of gender bias is more subtle than that of racial bias.
Gender bias is reflected in the prevalent attitude that a pregnant woman's
use of illegal drugs constitutes a singular menace to her child. The Pinel-
las County study and the myriad media expos6s on the subject fail to
mention the avoidable harms suffered by the fetus whose mother lacks
medical insurance and cannot obtain prenatal care or drug treatment.
Little attention is paid to the harmful effects on the fetus of a broad spec-
trum of legal behaviors, including cigarette smoke, alcohol, and many
prescription or over the counter medicines. Moreover, no mention is
made of fetal risks that are not in the pregnant woman's control, such as
exposure to hazardous chemicals, which "heighten[] the risk for sponta-
neous abortion, premature birth, stillbirth, low birth weight, and birth
defects." 25 In addition, differences among types of drugs and between
infrequent and habitual use are blurred, thus giving the false impression
that women who use drugs even once during pregnancy threaten their
fetuses' health in a manner that is exponentially more severe than any
other threat to fetal well being. Most notably, despite the narrowness of
the media focus on pregnant women using controlled substances, virtu-
ally no effort is made to understand the women at issue-their drug use,
the meaning of and reasons for their pregnancies, or the amount of con-
trol they have over their lives.
B. Pregnant Addicts as Women and as Addicts
There is no doubt that a significant percentage of women use drugs
during pregnancy. 26 Many of these women may be addicts. The
25. Cole, supra note 11, at 2666.
26. Note that the Pinellas County study is not a perfect model for estimating drug use
among pregnant women. First and foremost, as many as 27% of women of reproductive age
lack health insurance to cover maternity care, and therefore obtain prenatal care late in preg-
nancy, if at all. COMMrrTEE TO STUDY OUTREACH FOR PRENATAL CARE, INSTITUTE OF
MEDICINE, PRENATAL CARE: REACHING MOTHERS, REACHING INFANTS 56 (Sarah B.
Brown ed., 1988) [hereinafter PRENATAL CARE: REACHING MOTHERS, REACHING IN-
FANTS]. These women were excluded from the study, and it is difficult to predict how their
levels of substance use might differ from those who obtain early prenatal care. Second, urine
toxicology screens only reveal substances ingested during the 72 hours preceding the screen.
Children of Substance Abusers: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Children, Family, Drugs and
Alcoholism of the Senate Labor and Human Resources Comm., 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990)
(statement of Kary Moss, Attorney, ACLU, and Judy Crockett, Legislative Representative,
ACLU). Thus, women who screen negative actually might be users. Moreover, because these
tests are qualitative, not quantitative, they do not distinguish between one-time and chronic
use of a substance. Finally, since the screens in the study were performed at the first prenatal
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problems of pregnant addicts may be viewed as outgrowths of their sta-
tus as both women and addicts. Addicted women differ from addicted
men in ways that parallel differences among men and women within the
general culture.27 In general, addicted men develop psychological de-
fenses which prevent them from recognizing the consequences of their
behavior, thus protecting their self esteem and allowing their abusive
habit to continue. By denying the existence of a problem, men avoid
experiencing shame and fear, but they increase the likelihood of argu-
ments with family and friends.
28
In contrast, addicted women are far more likely to acknowledge the
existence of their problem. However, they are less likely to see their ad-
diction as a major problem, since they tend to view their habits as "thera-
peutic" or coping devices.29 These women often report "extreme levels
of depression and anxiety," in addition to very low self esteem.30 Dr.
Amin Daghestani has found that addicted women "are often involved in
abusive relationships," and he hypothesizes that "[t]his vulnerability to
physical abuse may stem from a history of being abused as children.
'31
Given their relatively weak self esteem, addicts run a high risk of
pregnancy. Even for a woman who is psychologically strong, or even
physically strong, it is often difficult to refuse unwanted sexual ad-
vances,32 or to insist on the use of contraception when engaging in sexual
relations. The addicted woman's low self esteem, coupled with the fact
that her partner may be abusive, renders her still less able to control the
visit, it is reasonable to assume that some of the women were not yet aware that they were
pregnant and thus not aware of the harm posed to the fetus by certain substances.
27. Beth G. Reed, Developing Women-Sensitive Drug-Dependence Treatment Services:
Why So Difficult?, 19 J. PSYCHOACTIVE DRUGS 151, 162 (1987).
28. Id. at 155.
29. Id at 152, 155; see also Amin Daghestani, Psychosocial Characteristics of Pregnant
Addicts, in DRUGS, ALCOHOL, PREGNANCY AND PARENTING 10 (Ira J. Chasnoff. ed., 1987).
30. Reed, supra note 27, at 155.
31. Daghestani, supra note 29, at 11. Researchers estimate that between 70% and 100%
of all women drug abusers are victims of incest or sexual violence. Renee M.Popovits,
Criminalization of Pregnant Substance Abusers A Health Care Perspective, 24 J. HEALTH &
Hosp. LAW 169,172 (1991) (discussing studies on drug dependency that found "up to seventy-
four percent of alcohol and drug dependent women reported incidents of sexual abuse" and
noting that the studies were "consistent with anecdotal reports from the few programs that
treat pregnant addicted women that eighty to ninety percent of their clients have been victims
of rape or incest").
32. See DIANA E.H. RUSSELL, SEXUAL EXPLOITATION: RAPE, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE,
AND WORKPLACE HARASSMENT 34-41 (1984) (citing statistics showing that out of 930 wo-
men surveyed, 24% reported at least one completed rape and 31% reported at least one at-
tempted rape); see also Laurie Goering, Fear Grips Women on Campuses, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 11,
1990, at D1 (survey by Mary Koss, Professor of Psychiatry at the University of Arizona,
reports that one out of four women have been the victim of rape or attempted rape).
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 43
circumstances of intercourse. She may, in other words, be in a less pow-
erful position than an otherwise similarly situated nonaddicted woman.
Furthermore, whether implicitly or explicitly, substance using women
often obtain their drugs in exchange for sex, and therefore may be unable
to refuse sexual relations without jeopardizing their drug supply.
33
Unwanted pregnancy can be avoided by the use of contraception,
yet most contraceptive methods are not well suited to the needs of ad-
dicted women. Barrier methods, such as the condom or the diaphragm,
require a high degree of user motivation and partner cooperation. A
study of female intravenous drug users in New York City found that
"proposals to change sexual practices (including the use of condoms) re-
quire redressing the balance of power within intimate relationships. For
these women, asking a man to use a condom provokes the fear of breach-
ing relations that may fulfill the woman's sexual, personal, financial, and
drug needs."' 34 Oral contraceptives, which are perhaps the most effective
means of preventing conception, are not appropriate for addicted women
because consistent pilltaking is crucial to their efficacy. The chaotic
schedules of these women essentially preclude them from taking a pill
once every twenty-four hours.35 A third option, the intrauterine device
(IUD), is undesirable because addicted women have a high incidence of
sexually transmitted diseases, increasing the likelihood of contracting
pelvic inflammatory disease, which may be fatal. 36 The advent of Nor-
plant, a long lasting contraceptive that is surgically implanted in a wo-
man's arm, may provide a suitable method for some addicted women. At
present, however, it not only is exceptionally costly (implantation costs
average $500), but also is restricted to a narrowly defined population of
medically eligible users.
37
33. Telephone Interview with Beth Reed, Ph.D., University of Michigan School of Social
Work, Ann Arbor, Michigan (May 21, 1990).
34. COMMITTEE ON AIDS RESEARCH AND THE BEHAVIORAL, SOCIAL, AND STATISTI-
CAL SCIENCES, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, AIDS: SEXUAL BEHAVIOR AND INTRAVE-
NOUS DRUG USE 199 (Charles F. Turner et al. eds., 1989) [hereinafter AIDS: SEXUAL
BEHAVIOR AND INTRAVENOUS DRUG USE]; see also Dooley Worth, Sexual Decision-Making
and AIDS: Why Condom Promotion Among Vulnerable Women is Likely to Fail, 20 STUD.
FAM. PLAN. 297 (1989).
35. Telephone Interview with Gay Chism, Registered Nurse, National Association for
Perinatal Addiction Research and Education (NAPARE), Chicago, Illinois (June 6, 1990).
36. Id,
37. Present guidelines limit Norplant to use in women who weigh less than 150 pounds,
and who are free of complicating medical conditions such as diabetes, heart conditions, or high
blood pressure. Interview with Ms. Susan Nankin, Clinic Manager, Chicago Area Planned
Parenthood, Northside Clinic, in Chicago, Ill. (December 10, 1991).
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Birth rates for addicted women have been shown to exceed those for
nonaddicted women.38 In part, this is because many of these women
want to have children, regardless of their life circumstances. 39 In addi-
tion, chronic drug or alcohol use can lead to a decreased awareness of
body changes. Thus, addicts tend to attribute their missed menses to
drug use, rather than to pregnancy, and often wait until late into preg-
nancy to seek care.40 The addicted woman who discovers her pregnancy
prior to the point of fetal viability and wishes to abort faces the same
financial barriers encountered by all indigent women.4 1 However, be-
cause she is more likely to discover her pregnancy in the mid-trimester,
her abortion will be considerably more expensive than an early trimester
procedure, a factor which may preclude abortion as an option.
C. Access to Care
Without a doubt, the best interests of society, as well as those of the
pregnant woman and the fetus she carries, are served by enabling the
pregnant drug user to obtain prenatal care and, when necessary, drug
abuse treatment, as early as possible in her pregnancy. Research has
shown that the chances for a healthy baby significantly increase the
sooner in the pregnancy the substance using woman seeks medical care.42
From an economic perspective, providing care will save society mil-
lions of dollars because insurance coverage for these women is so limited
that society eventually absorbs most of the costs incurred for childbirth,
delivery, and for the baby's health care. The National Association for
Perinatal Addiction Research and Education estimates the health care
costs for treating a cocaine addicted woman who obtains prenatal care at
38. AIDS: SEXUAL BEHAVIOR AND INTRAVENOUS DRUG UsE, supra note 34, at 200.
39. The desire to procreate is fundamentally human, and regardless of their status in
society, people look to their children as sources of love, support, and meaningfulness. Because
of this, the U.S. Supreme Court long has viewed the right to procreate as fundamental, and has
reviewed with strict scrutiny any state actions limiting this right. See Carey v. Population
Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
40. Daghestani, supra note 29, at 9. The majority of addicted women who seek prenatal
care do so in the third trimester. Id.
41. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); see also Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464
(1977). In addition to financial barriers, women, and especially poor women, soon may face
"informational" barriers as well, due to the recent U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Rust v. Sulli-
van, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991). Since the summer of 1991 health care practitioners who receive
federal funding have been now prohibited from counseling pregnant women about the option
of abortion. Id.
42. Ira J. Chasnoff et al., Temporal Patterns of Cocaine Use in Pregnancy, 261 JAMA
1741, 1742 (1989) [hereinafter Chasnoff et al., Temporal Patterns].
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$7000.43 This figure includes prenatal care, the maternal hospital stay,
and two days of neonatal care.
In contrast, the costs incurred by an addict who fails to obtain pre-
natal care are strikingly higher, averaging $31,000, due to the increased
need for neonatal intensive care.44 These estimates do not include social
service interventions, educational costs, or the long term care which the
child affected by maternal drug use may require. 45 They also omit all
costs relating to the rehabilitation of the mother and her additional
children.46
(1) Pregnant Addicts' Access to Care Generally
Despite the foregoing, access to prenatal care has diminished in re-
cent years, particularly among poor women. As a result, the incidences
of low birth weight, infant mortality, and maternal mortality have risen.
While the principal reason for the failure to obtain care is financial, and
women with private health insurance obtain prenatal care more easily
than uninsured or Medicaid-enrolled women, even private insurance
plans often provide only limited maternity coverage. 47 Women covered
by Medicaid generally rely on overburdened clinics for prenatal care and,
as a result, tend to obtain prenatal care later in pregnancy and to make
fewer visits to providers than women with private insurance.48 More-
over, more than one quarter of "women of reproductive age... have no
43. Missing Links: Coordinating Federal Drug Policy for Women, Infants and Children:
Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 75 (1989)
(statement of Dr. Ira J. Chasnoff, President, NAPARE).
44. Id.
45. Id. Estimates of the cost of lifelong care for Fetal Alcohol Syndrome babies range
from $600,000 to $2.6 million. See, eg., Campaign for Safer Wombs Begun, UPI, Oct. 18,
1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File; DAAA Unveils New Campaign Against
Alcohol-Related Birth Defects, PR Newswire, May 10, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Li-
brary, Wires file.
46. We could, of course, allow the babies to die. One way to change the numbers is to
change the standard of practice. As of yet, no one advocates such overt neglect. This sugges-
tion, however, is not as implausible as it may sound if one examines present policy. Essen-
tially, current practice condones the more pernicious, and ironically more costly, process of
taking virtually no action that might prevent harm to women, fetuses, and babies, such as
increasing access to obstetrical care and drug treatment, or providing women and children
with safe shelter and adequate nutrition. It should be noted that the United States ranks
higher than nineteen other countries in infant mortality, with nearly 40,000 babies dying annu-
ally before they reach their first birthday. Robert Pear, Study Says U.S. Needs to Battle Infant
Mortality, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 6, 1990, at Al.
47. PRENATAL CARE: REACHING MOTHERS, REACHING INFANTS, supra note 26, at 4-
48. Id. at 5.
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insurance to cover maternity care, and two-thirds of these... have no
health insurance at all."49
In addition to the lack of access to prenatal care, drug abuse treat-
ment programs are insufficient to meet demand. Even by the Bush ad-
ministration's account, there are over one million addicts in this country
who currently want drug abuse treatment but are unable to get it.5o
Moreover, if an addict lacks private insurance, her treatment options are
far more limited, and she typically must wait several months prior to
commencing even outpatient services.51
Given these treatment shortages, it comes as no surprise that care
designed to address the special needs of pregnant addicts is almost non-
existent. Pregnancy complicates the ordinary drug rehabilitation pro-
cess, in part because the impact of withdrawal on the fetus must be taken
into consideration. For example, too rapid a withdrawal from heroin
may induce a miscarriage. 52 Additional problems are posed by pregnant
women addicted to cocaine and crack. Because these addictions are rela-
tively new, there are few established methods for treating the addictions
themselves, let alone for addressing the effect on the fetus of withdrawal
from these drugs. Moreover, substance abuse treatment must address
the pregnant addict's special needs, which are substantially broader than
those of other addicts. Compounding the problems of personal and fi-
nancial instability, the pregnant addict generally already has at least one
living child.5 3 Therefore, in addition to the therapeutic assistance she
requires in order to break her drug habit, she should be trained in parent-
ing skills, self esteem, skills for autonomous living, stress management,
financial planning, and nutrition to meet both her own needs and those of
her children. 54 Moreover, she likely will need child care assistance dur-
49. Id.
50. Andrew H. Malcolm, In Making Drug Strategy, No Accord on Treatment, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 19, 1989, § 1, at 1.
51. See id. In spite of this, President Bush's 1990 National Drug Control Strategy em-
phasizes law enforcement rather than treatment. Herbert D. Kleber, Deputy Director for De-
mand Reduction at the Office of National Drug Control Policy, justifies this by stating that,
"only half, at best, of cocaine addicts are drug-free one to two years after treatment," and by
noting that "private treatment centers are, on average, only 55 percent full." No Quick Fixes
for Drug Addicts, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1990, at A31. In other words, we need not assist those
seeking to break their habits since they may fail anyway, and those who want to quit must find
the thousands of dollars necessary to pay for private treatment on their own.
52. Louis G. Keith et al., Drug Abuse in Pregnancy, in DRUGS, ALCOHOL, PREGNANCY
AND PARENTING, supra note 29, at 30.
53. Interview with Beth Reed, supra note 33.
54. Reed, supra note 27, at 156-57.
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ing treatment.55 Few existing treatment programs are capable of provid-
ing this scope of services.
56
(2) Pregnant Addicts and Drug Abuse Treatment Programs
In order to gain a sense of the barriers which women who choose to
seek drug abuse treatment may encounter, my assistants and I conducted
a brief survey of treatment programs in the Chicago area on behalf of a
hypothetical friend, whom we described as twenty years-old, employed
part-time, lacking health insurance, eight weeks pregnant and using co-
caine on a daily basis.
We began our survey in August 1989 by contacting the Illinois De-
partment of Alcoholism and Substance Abuse for a list of all licensed
treatment facilities. They informed us that they had run out of their
1988/1989 lists, and that there would be a six month wait until the new
list was published, which we could purchase for $25. Admittedly, a state
agency is an unlikely place for a pregnant addict to begin her search for.
treatment, but that response was enough to deter even a hearty re-
searcher. We therefore contacted all twenty-seven of the substance abuse
treatment centers listed in the greater Chicago area Yellow Pages and
asked a series of treatment related questions on behalf of our hypotheti-
cal friend.
57
Almost all of the twenty-seven facilities we contacted indicated that
inpatient treatment is recommended for pregnant cocaine addicts. Of the
nine inpatient programs we contacted, seven accepted pregnant women.
The minimum cost for these programs, however, was $12,000 per month,
and none of them accepted Medicaid or offered any substantial financial
assistance.
Next, we attempted to locate an outpatient program for our friend.
Of the fifteen outpatient programs we identified, eight accepted pregnant
women, but only four of these accepted Medicaid. Of further interest
was the frequency with which we were referred to other programs. Vir-
tually every program we contacted referred us to other local programs,
giving us the distinct impression that our friend was unwelcome. Sur-
prisingly, only eight of the twenty-seven programs mentioned Northwest-
ern's Perinatal Center for Chemical Dependence, which accepts
55. Id.
56. Telephone Interview with Dr. Ira Chasnoff, Director of the Perinatal Center for
Chemical Dependence, Northwestern University Memorial Hospital, Chicago, III. (Aug. 9,
1989).
57. While we contacted 27 facilities, many were hesitant to discuss their programs with
us once we mentioned that we sought services for a pregnant woman. In fact, three facilities
hung up before we were able to discern the nature of the services they provided.
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Medicaid and is the nation's leading program for treatment of pregnant
addicts. One certainly would expect that anyone working in this field,
especially in the Chicago area, would know of this program. Moreover,
seven programs referred us to centers which, when contacted, refused to
accept pregnant women.
Our results indicate that access is limited by an addict's financial
status and also by less predictable variables such as luck and persever-
ance. If she is willing to call enough facilities, a pregnant addict may
eventually find one that is willing to accept her. While our survey did
not aspire to statistical validity but, rather, aimed only to document the
availability of treatment, our findings closely paralleled those of Dr.
Wendy Chavkin of Columbia School of Public Health. In a comprehen-
sive 1989 study, Dr. Chavkin surveyed treatment programs in New York
City and found that 87% would not accept pregnant crack addicts re-
ceiving Medicaid. 58
There seem to be four basic reasons for the treatment shortages for
pregnant addicts. First, there is little incentive to provide such services,
as these patients tend to be noncompliant and costly. Pregnant addicts
miss almost 38% of their scheduled medical appointments.5 9 Those re-
ceiving public assistance, like all patients receiving public assistance, are
even less attractive, due to the low reimbursement rates paid by Medicaid
and the time consuming paper work required for filing claims.
Second, women who are addicts tend to experience complications
during pregnancy. Physicians and treatment centers fear treating women
with high-risk pregnancies because the potential for legal liability is
greater when a baby is born with problems. 6° Added to this is the possi-
bility of a lawsuit claiming that the withdrawal process itself damaged
the fetus. While the success of any lawsuit based on negligence requires
proof of causation, which is virtually unobtainable due to the con-
founding effect of maternal drug use, the financial and emotional costs
incurred by the defendant in successfully defending a lawsuit are by no
means insignificant.
58. Wendy Chavkin, Drug Addiction and Pregnancy: Policy Crossroads, 80 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 483, 485 (1990); see Tamar Lewin, Drug Use During Pregnancy: New Issue for the
Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1990, at Al.
59. Keith et al., supra note 52, at 19.
60. See Martin J. Hatlie, Professional Liability: The Case for Federal Reform, 263 JAMA
584, 584 (1990) ("As of 1987, 12.4% of U.S. obstetrician-gynecologists nationally had given up
obstetrics owing to liability concerns and 27% had decreased the level of high risk obstetric
care they provided. Even larger numbers of family physicians have stopped providing obstetri-
cal services.") (footnote omitted).
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Third, many pregnant addicts are at high risk for contracting the
human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), which may later progress to
AIDS.6 1 This is especially true for female intravenous drug users, a large
percentage of whom are known to be HIV positive.62 Therefore, in addi-
tion to the other barriers to treatment, these women will face resistance
from practitioners who avoid treating HIV positive patients.
Finally, access to treatment is limited simply because drug rehabili-
tation programs and individual practitioners are not prepared to handle
the complex needs of a pregnant addict. As previously noted, pregnant
addicts require a broad range of services. Treatment programs already
are struggling for funding and are unable to provide the extended care
needed by this special group of addicts.
This discussion ignores the question of whether drug abuse treat-
ment, even if provided free of cost and with acute sensitivity to the needs
of pregnant addicts, actually will work. I have reserved my discussion of
this question because the legal system has not considered it relevant in its
response to problems of addiction. Generally, society views addicts as
sick individuals in need of help and uses the law to encourage or force
them to obtain whatever treatment exists. 63 In this Article's final section
I will return to the question and will discuss methods for enhancing
treatment's chances of success.
III. Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Laws and Their
Impact on Pregnant Users of Controlled Substances
States' principal legal response to the problem of controlled sub-
stance use by pregnant women has been the attempt to invoke child
abuse and neglect reporting laws. Such an approach is inadequate for
reasons of constitutionality and statutory construction, as will be ad-
dressed in the next section of this Article. In this section, I will discuss
the equal inadequacy of looking to the nation's chronically underfunded
child welfare system, with its decaying infrastructure, for a solution to
this problem.
61. See Daghestani, supra note 29, at 10-11.
62. Id. at 10; see also Ellie E. Schoenbaum et al., Risk Factors for Human Immu-
nodeficiency irus Infection in Intravenous Drug Users, 321 Nrw ENG. J. MED. 874, 875
(1989) (of 219 female intravenous drug users enrolled in a methadone treatment program,
37.4% tested HIV positive).
63. See, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962).
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A. Reports to State Agencies and Their Consequences
Given the difficulties involved in securing treatment for drug abuse,
a pregnant addict might be well advised to seek out prenatal care before
attempting to find an addiction treatment program. If she manages to
find an obstetrician, she then must decide whether or not to inform the
doctor of her addiction. The reasons favoring disclosure are obvious, yet
intangible: disclosure will enable the doctor to tailor a special course of
prenatal care for her; it will permit the diagnosis and treatment of any
unusual signs of maternal or fetal distress during the pregnancy; and the
doctor should be able to direct her to a drug abuse treatment program-
albeit one which may have no room for her or one that she cannot afford.
Assuming, however, that the woman wishes to carry the pregnancy
to term and to retain custody of her child, there are several very concrete
reasons for her to hide her addiction from the doctor. In essence, by
telling the doctor, the pregnant addict may trigger a state child abuse and
neglect reporting statute, thereby inviting state scrutiny of her preg-
nancy, addiction, and recuperation, and jeopardizing her present 64 and
future custody of the child she is carrying.
65
To better understand why a woman might choose not to tell her
physician that she is addicted, one need only review the sequence of
events triggered by the filing of a report with the child protective services
agency. I use Illinois' scenario as an example. Illinois law defines use of
a controlled substance by a pregnant woman as child neglect, and re-
quires that newborns who test positive for controlled substance exposure
64. For example, some judges who believe that a fetus' well being is jeopardized by the
decisions of the pregnant woman have awarded temporary custody of the fetus to a court
appointed guardian. Thus, in what is perhaps the ultimate legal fiction, the pregnant woman
loses "custody" of the baby she carries with her 24 hours a day. For an excellent discussion of
this problem, see, Lawrence J. Nelson et al., Forced Medical Treatment of Pregnant Women:
"Compelling Each to Live as Seems Good to the Rest, " 37 HASTINGS L.J. 703 (1986). See algo
Michael Vitillo, Baby Jane Doe: Stating a Cause of Action Against the Officious Intermeddler,
37 HASTINGS L.J. 863 (1986) (suggesting parents should be able to bring a privacy action
against official intermeddlers).
65. Normally, all the information that a patient reveals to her physician in the course of
seeking medical treatment is protected from disclosure by the physician-patient privilege. E.g.,
Home v. Patton, 291 Ala. 701, 706-07, 287 So. 2d 824, 829-30 (1973); Smith v. Driscoll, 94
Wash. 441, 443, 162 P. 572, 572 (1917). However, this privilege is overridden by both federal
and state laws mandating that a health practitioner who has reason to suspect that her patient
is committing child abuse or neglect report the patient to the state agency charged with imple-
menting the child protection act. See Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974, 42
U.S.C. §§ 5101-5107 (1988) and various state laws. The federal statute establishes criteria
with which each state must comply in order to receive federal funding. Accordingly, with
some minor differences, state reporting laws basically resemble the federal law. See, e.g., ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 23, para. 2054 (1989).
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be reported to the Department of Children and Family Services
(DCFS).66 While the law does not require doctors to test all newborns, a
pregnant woman who reveals a history of drug abuse provides her doctor
with reasons67 for notifying DCFS immediately or for testing the new-
born at birth.
Maternal custody is revoked temporarily by the DCFS immediately
upon receipt of a report of a positive toxicology screen in a newborn.
68
In other words, on the basis of one test, the baby is separated from its
mother for the first week of its life. This effectively precludes the mother
from breastfeeding, which is tremendously important for the newborn's
well being.69 Within seven days of the report, the DCFS conducts an
informal investigation to determine whether it is in the child's best inter-
ests to stay with the mother, who is not provided with legal counsel. A
formal hearing on the matter of temporary foster care is held within
thirty days of the informal investigation. Again, the state does not pro-
vide counsel. If the mother is found unable to care for her child, she is
expected to begin a treatment program tailored to meet her needs, and
only upon the DCFS's determination that she is capable of caring for her
child may she resume custody.
70
66. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, paras. 2053-2054 (1989).
67. The Illinois statute requires that doctors who have "reasonable cause to believe a
child known to them in their professional or official capacity may be an abused or neglected
child shall immediately report... to the Department." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, para. 2054
(1989). However, not all newborns who have been exposed to a controlled substance fit the
statutory definition of a neglected child. Only newborns "whose blood or urine contains any
amount of controlled substance" is a neglected child. Id. para. 2053(e). Nonetheless, when a
pregnant patient informs her doctor that she has used a controlled substance, the doctor may
consider this to be reasonable cause to believe the child or fetus is neglected, triggering the
doctor's duty to file a report. Likewise, the doctor may chose to store the information and test
the baby at birth, or may chose to do nothing with it, depending on what the doctor construes
as reasonable cause to suspect neglect.
68. Telephone Interview with Gregory Seifert, Assistant Legal Counsel for Illinois De-
partment of Children and Family Services (Oct. 2, 1989); see also ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 23,
paras. 2053-2055 (1989).
69. Interview with Dr. Lori Walsh, Chicago area Pediatrician, in Chicago, Ill. (June 9,
1991).
70. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 23, para. 2055; ch. 37, para. 802-10 (Supp. 1991). Not only is
this protocol rife with internal weaknesses, due to inadequate funding which has severely ham-
pered DCFS's ability to operate, see infra notes 83-90 and accompanying text, it is also suscep-
tible to significant abuse, as illustrated in the case of Theresa L., In re Ryan, 74 N.Y.2d 892,
547 N.E.2d 104, 547 N.Y.S.2d 849 (1989). Theresa L.'s ordeal took place in New York, whose
law in this area is similar to Illinois' law. When Theresa learned she was pregnant, she sought
prenatal care. At her first visit to the doctor, she reported having used both marijuana and
cocaine a few years earlier, although she was not a current user. Theresa was very responsible
during her pregnancy: She attended Lamaze classes and eliminated all caffeine and medica-
tions from her diet. When she went into labor at home, a friend who was a registered nurse
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It is important to note that not only doctors report the use of con-
trolled substances by pregnant women. Depending on state law, a wide
range of health care professionals may be required to report suspected
child neglect to the state.71 At least one state even encourages voluntary
reports from members of the community at large.
72
B. Structural Disincentives to Obtaining Medical Care
The scenario triggered by a report during or immediately following
pregnancy of maternal drug use is so frightening from the woman's per-
spective that these child abuse laws may have the ironic result of encour-
aging abortion. An equally perverse consequence is that pregnant drug
users who hope to continue their pregnancies and to retain custody may
be discouraged from seeking the health care treatment that is needed for
maternal and fetal welfare alike.
The woman wishing to maintain custody has three basic options:
not seek any care; seek prenatal care, but not disclose her addiction; or
disclose her addiction and seek both prenatal and substance abuse treat-
ment. If she does not seek any care, she jeopardizes her own health, as
well as that of her fetus, but minimizes the risk of losing custody. She
only risks losing custody if she delivers the child at a hospital and it is
tested for drugs. 73 Provided that the child is not significantly premature,
which is one possible consequence of maternal drug use, and that the
mother is not delivering at an inner city public hospital, where testing
suggested she smoke some marijuana to relieve the stress and pain of her contractions. Later,
she delivered a healthy baby boy at the hospital.
For unknown reasons, the hospital tested the baby and found that he screened positive for
THC, the active ingredient in marijuana. Child Protective Services were notified, and they
immediately filed for and received temporary custody. The baby was placed in foster care.
Theresa's doctor, mother, and social worker all testified to her ability to care for the child.
Nevertheless, the judge reviewed the medical record and decided that Theresa had exercised
"bad judgment." Custody was given to Theresa's mother. Theresa was not allowed to see the
baby alone and was ordered to attend a drug treatment program. Several hearings and some
nine months later, the case was dismissed for lack of evidence that Theresa was neglectful and
Theresa finally regained custody.
71. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, para. 2054 (list includes various law enforcement
personnel, child care workers, and some state agency personnel).
72. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.5561 (West Supp. 1992). Minnesota law encourages re-
ports by any person suspecting that a pregnant woman has used a controlled substance for a
nonmedical purpose. See infra notes 91-143 and accompanying text for a full discussion of this
law.
73. In South Carolina, where prosecutors have filed criminal charges against 18 women
who allegedly took drugs during pregnancy, sources in the medical community report "a rise
in the number of women giving birth at home, in taxis and in bathrooms." Pregnant and
Newly Delivered Women Jailed on Drug Charges, REPROD. RTS. UPDATE 6 (ACLU/Reprod.
Freedom Project, New York, N.Y., Feb. 1, 1990).
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rapidly is becoming universal, 74 chances are that the child will not be
tested.75 If she seeks prenatal care but does not disclose her addiction,
her chances of a healthy delivery are enhanced, but she runs the risk of
the doctor discovering her drug use and choosing (or, in Minnesota, be-
ing obligated) to report her to the state agency. Disclosing her addiction
and seeking both substance abuse and prenatal treatment would be ideal
if treatment were available, and if the woman felt confident that she
could overcome her addiction. However, not only is there little treat-
ment available, but few addicts feel secure about their ability to overcome
their addictions, even without the existence of a nine month (or shorter)
time period in which to do S0.76
A related disincentive to seeking health care derives from a fear of
criminal prosecution. The likelihood that a health care provider will dis-
cover the use of controlled substances and report a pregnant woman to
law enforcement authorities may be remote. Yet once her status as a
drug user is known by others, the risk of disclosure to the criminal justice
system increases. An example of the limitations on confidentiality are
revealed in a case77 involving a Michigan woman whose obstetrician or-
dered her tested because she told him of her cocaine use. Once she tested
positive, the hospital kept the baby for observation, tested the baby and
then notified the Department of Social Services (DSS) of the positive re-
sult. Both the doctor's decision to test and the hospital's decision to re-
port were optional. However, once DSS received the report, it was
obligated to notify the local prosecutor.78 On the basis of the baby's test
results, the Muskegon County Prosecutor charged her with delivering
drugs to a minor.79
C. Public Health Pitfalls and Shortcomings Inherent in a Reporting Policy
The resort to child abuse and neglect reporting systems for tracking
and contending with pregnant addicts is a policy replete with logistical
74. See Gina Kolata, Bias Seen Against Pregnant Addicts, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1990, at
A13.
75. Hoffman, supra note 13, at 44.
76. Note that the Minnesota law authorizes emergency involuntary admissions of preg-
nant women who fail recommended treatment. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.5561(2) (West Supp.
1992).
77. Hoffman, supra note 13, at 33.
78. Under Michigan law, DSS must notify the county prosecutor whenever it finds in-
stances of child abuse. MICH. COMP. LAWS 722.623 § 3(6) (1991). Tony Tague, the county
prosecutor, has chosen to define evidence of cocaine or alcohol abuse by a woman during
pregnancy as child abuse. Hoffman, supra note 13, at 53. Most states consider this to be at
most neglect, and thus their criminal justice systems do not receive notice of it. See, eg., ILL.
REV. STAT., ch. 23, para. 2053 (Supp. 1989).
79. Lisa Perlman, Cocaine Babies, ANN ARBOR NEWS, April 22, 1990, at A7.
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problems, such as the lack of sufficient drug rehabilitation programs that
meet the needs of pregnant women and new mothers, and the fact that
there are geographical areas in which there are no drug rehabilitation
programs at all. Because subsidized treatment programs are in short
supply, new mothers needing treatment may be separated from their
newborns, yet unable to begin the therapy designed to reunite them. This
result looks a great deal more like punishment than rehabilitation. Addi-
tionally, existing treatment programs are ill-suited to women's needs.
Sociologist Beth Reed explains that standard treatment for both alcohol-
ism and drug addiction is premised on a male model: "[I]n many pro-
grams, a woman's experiences . . . may increase her difficulties ....
Tactics that are used early in treatment, which were developed to help
men face what they have long denied, may cause women with learned
helplessness patterns to feel even more hopeless and out of control."80
Without appropriate treatment, these women are not likely to break their
addictions. Moreover, they remain fertile and capable of repeating the
cycle with yet another pregnancy.
One might find consolation, if not justification, for such a policy if it
protected the welfare of the children. Unfortunately, this is not the case.
Nationally, the foster care system is in a state of crisis. A recent article
described it as "a multibillion-dollar system of confusion and misdirec-
tion, overwhelmed by the profusion of sick, battered and emotionally
scarred children who are becoming the responsibility of the public."81
This crisis is the result of a precipitous rise in the number of reports of
abuse, and in the number of children in foster care, coupled with a radi-
cal decline in the number of foster parents.
8 2
As a result, child protection agencies are strained to the point that
they are unable to insure their wards' safety.8 3 In Fall 1989, a class ac-
tion lawsuit was filed against the Illinois DCFS on behalf of all children
who have been or will be removed from their parents' custody.84 The
suit alleges that the DCFS has not placed the children in safe and stable
80. Reed, supra note 27, at 151, 155.
81. J.C. Bardon, Foster Care System Reeling, Despite Law Meant To Help, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 21, 1990, at Al.
82. See id. Reports of abuse have risen from 0.5 million in 1976 to almost 2.5 million in
1986. In 1980, there were 147,000 foster homes, while today there are only 100,000. Today's
foster family averages more than three children per home, double the number in 1980. Id.
83. See Michael B. Mushlin, Unsafe Havens: The Case for Constitutional Protection of
Foster Children From Abuse and Neglect, 23 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rnv. 199, 207-09 (1988)
(citing findings that 43% of foster children are placed in unsuitable foster homes and 57% of
children in the foster care system are at serious risk of harm due to instability of care, lack of
access to medical care, and high incidence of physical and sexual abuse).
84. B.H. v. Johnson, No. 88 C 5599 (N.D. Ill. filed Oct. 16, 1989).
[Vol. 43
DRUGS, PREGNANCY, AND LAW
homes, and that "plaintiffs frequently have been shuffled among six or
more temporary living arrangements for two or more years and hundreds
of them have been victims of neglect or abuse at an increasing rate."
'8 5
Mr. Benjamin Wolfe, one of the attorneys for petitioners, explains that
case workers whose case load would normally be twenty to twenty-five
cases per month now are assigned between eighty and one hundred
cases. 86 Case workers therefore are unable to supervise and protect the
children in their care. A shortage of foster homes has led to the "ware-
housing" of children in overcrowded and dangerous shelters. The com-
plaint cites a May 1988 incident in one such shelter, where an eight year-
old child was raped by two twelve year-olds after the state "failed to
respond to repeated and consistent reports that the institution was unable
adequately to protect the children residing there."
87
The warehousing of children in temporary shelters is not limited to
older children, but also is a common response to newborns who have
tested positive for exposure to illicit substances. In Illinois, for example,
the DCFS has a subcontract with Catholic Charities, which runs a foster
care shelter in a former hospital on Chicago's North Side. Babies who
are removed from their mothers because of a presumption of neglect are
housed there pending either placement in a foster home or reunification
with their families. The shelter provides for an average of forty babies at
any given time, the overwhelming majority of whom are minorities.
88
Placing these babies is difficult, both because of their race and their un-
certain health status,89 but many of them do leave the shelter for "emer-
gency placements." These placements are advantageous to foster parents
because the reimbursement is significantly higher than that for ordinary
temporary custody placement. There is, however, a thirty day limit on
an emergency placement, so many of the babies cycle repeatedly into and
out of the facility, deprived of consistency in caretakers and of any sense
of a stable environment. 90
85. Second Amended Complaint at 2, Johnson, (No. 88 C 5599).
86. Telephone Interview with Benjamin Wolfe, staff attorney, Illinois Civil Liberties
Union (Sept. 7, 1989).
87. Second Amended Complaint at 9, Johnson, (No. 88 C 5599).
88. During my visit there, on November 29, 1990, all of the babies were black, except one
who was hispanic.
89. Bardon, supra note 81, at Al.
90. Interview with Sister Honora, Executive Director, Columbus-Maryville Children's
Reception Center in Columbia, Ohio (Nov. 29, 1990).
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IV. Child Abuse and Neglect Laws and the Pregnant Woman:
A Case of Gender Discrimination
As a matter of public policy, applying child abuse and neglect laws
to pregnant women who use controlled substances is short sighted and
pernicious. As a matter of law, the practice violates common law princi-
ples and constitutional rights. The following section will provide a legal
critique of this policy by analyzing it under current laws governing gen-
der discrimination. The Minnesota law regarding reporting of prenatal
exposure to controlled substances will serve as a model for this
analysis.91
A. Pregnancy Based Discrimination and Heightened Scrutiny
The first step in analyzing a statute under the Equal Protection
Clause is to determine whether it represents discrimination against a pro-
tected class and therefore merits heightened scrutiny.92 Because the
Minnesota law is directed solely at pregnant women, it draws a gender
based distinction and, thus, raises an equal protection issue. In the past,
however, laws that discriminate against women but are based on biologi-
91. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 626.5561-626.5562 (West Supp. 1992). In pertinent part, the
statute reads:
626.5561 Reporting of Prenatal Exposure to Controlled Substances
Subdivision 1. Reports Required. A person mandated to report ... shall imme-
diately report to the local welfare agency if the person knows or has reason to believe
that a woman is pregnant and has used a controlled substance for a nonmedical
purpose during the pregnancy. Any person may make a voluntary report if the per-
son knows or has reason to believe that a woman is pregnant and has used a con-
trolled substance for a nonmedical purpose during the pregnancy....
Subd. 2. Local Welfare Agency. If the report alleges a pregnant woman's use of
a controlled substance for a nonmedical purpose, the local welfare agency shall im-
mediately conduct an appropriate assessment and offer services indicated under the
circumstances.... The local welfare agency shall seek an emergency admission ... if
the pregnant woman refuses recommended voluntary services or fails recommended
treatment. 626.5562 Toxicology Tests Required
Subdivision 1. Test; Report. A physician shall administer a toxicology test to a
pregnant woman under the physician's care ... to determine whether there is evi-
dence that she has ingested a controlled substance, if the woman has obstetrical com-
plications that are a medical indication of possible use of a controlled substance for a
nonmedical purpose. If the test results are positive, the physician shall report the
results....
Subd. 2. Newborns. A physician shall administer to each newborn infant born
under the physician's care a toxicology test to determine whether there is evidence of
prenatal exposure to a controlled substance, if the physician has reason to believe
based on a medical assessment of the mother or the infant that the mother used a
controlled substance for a nonmedical purpose during the pregnancy. If the test re-
sults are positive, the physician shall report the results as neglect ....
92. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-17 n.14 (1982).
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cal differences between the sexes have caused reviewing courts much con-
sternation. For example, in Geduldig v. Aiello,93 the Supreme Court used
a minimal rationality standard to analyze a California disability insur-
ance policy that exempted coverage for normal pregnancy and child-
birth.94 The Court refused to view a distinction based on pregnancy as a
sex based classification, subject to heightened scrutiny. Instead, the ma-
jority reasoned that "absent a showing that distinctions involving preg-
nancy are mere pretexts designed to effect an invidious discrimination
against the members of one sex or the other, lawmakers are constitution-
ally free to include or exclude pregnancy from the coverage of legislation
such as this on any reasonable basis." 95 While the Supreme Court has
not faced an equal protection challenge of gender discrimination based
on pregnancy since Geduldig, several factors make it likely that if a law
governing the use of controlled substances by pregnant women were
challenged as discriminatory today, it would be reviewed under height-
ened (or intermediate level) scrutiny.
First, Congress rejected the Court's approach in Geduldig by enact-
ing the 1978 Pregnancy Discrimination Act,96 which established that
workplace discrimination on the basis of "pregnancy, childbirth or re-
lated medical conditions" is tantamount to sex discrimination. 97 There-
after, the Supreme Court acknowledged that "for all Title VII purposes,
discrimination based on a woman's pregnancy is, on its face, discrimina-
tion because of her sex."98 The recent Supreme Court opinion in UAW v.
Johnson Controls,99 a Title VII case involving employment discrimina-
tion, demonstrates the Court's present understanding of pregnancy based
discrimination as sex discrimination in the workplace:
The bias in Johnson Controls' policy is obvious. Fertile men, but not
fertile women, are given a choice as to whether they wish to risk their
reproductive health for a particular job .... The court [of appeals]
assumed that because the asserted reason for the sex based exclusion
(protecting women's unconceived offspring) was ostensibly benign, the
policy was not sex based discrimination. That assumption, however,
was incorrect. 1°°
Even though the Pregnancy Discrimination Act has no bearing on the
Court's interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause, it would be ludi-
93. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
94. Id
95. Id. at 496 n.20.
96. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988).
97. Id.
98. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 684 (1983).
99. International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991).
100. Id. at 1202-03.
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crous for the Court to recognize pregnancy based discrimination as sex
discrimination in the workplace, but not in other settings.
Second, statutes like Minnesota's make broader gender based classi-
fications than did the statute at issue in Geduldig. For instance, while
Geduldig dealt specifically with the permissibility of pregnancy based dis-
crimination, the Minnesota law regulates the actions of all women of re-
productive age. 101 Specifically, by requiring reports on women believed
to be pregnant and using drugs for a nonmedical purpose, the statute
sanctions the state investigation and supervision of virtually all women,
but not men. Thus, regardless of whether this discrimination is justified
by virtue of women's unique capacity to bear children, it is undeniable
that the law draws a line based on gender, requiring heightened scrutiny.
One might argue that, even if these laws discriminate against wo-
men, they do not do so intentionally, and therefore do not merit height-
ened scrutiny. The Supreme Court case of Personnel Administrator of
Massachusetts v. Feeny'02 limits heightened scrutiny to cases in which
there is overt discrimination on the basis of sex or in which a facially
neutral policy is intentionally adopted because of its discriminatory ef-
fect. Statutes like Minnesota's, however, explicitly govern the actions of
pregnant women. This constitutes overt discrimination on the basis of
sex, and therefore, these statutes should receive heightened scrutiny.
B. Protecting Fetal and Newborn Health: An Important Government
Function?
Under the analysis of gender discrimination set forth in Craig v. Bo-
ren, 10 3 in order to be constitutional, the purpose of the Minnesota law
must represent an important government function, and the gender based
distinction must closely serve to achieve that purpose./°4 By classifying
it under the state's child abuse and neglect law, the implied purpose of
Minnesota's statute seems to be the protection of the health of fetuses
and newborn babies. There is clear evidence that both licit and illicit
substances can harm fetal development, potentially causing miscarriage
or lifelong impairment.10 5 At first blush, then, it seems that causing such
harm should constitute child abuse and should be prohibited by the child
abuse and neglect statutes. However, the problematic nature of the stat-
ute's purpose of protecting fetuses is that, prior to viability, it is not clear
101. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.5561 (West Supp. 1992).
102. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
103. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
104. Id. at 199-200.
105. Chasnoff et al., Temporal Patterns, supra note 42, at 1743.
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that fetuses posses legal rights sufficient to permit state regulation of their
mother's bodies.
Historically, the fetus had no rights independent of its mother, and
thus, the common law barred recovery for injuries sustained in utero.
10 6
In this century, suits based on harms inflicted prior to birth have been
allowed, but only when the fetus survives and is live born.10 7 The deci-
sions allowing such recovery, however, do not recognize fetal rights, but
instead focus "on the need for compensation of a living person wrong-
fully injured." 108
Recently, some courts have recognized a child's "legal right to begin
life with a sound mind and body."10 9 This right does not reflect a state
interest in protecting the fetus, but instead sidesteps the issue of the fetus'
legal status by addressing the live born child. However, if this right is to
have any beneficial impact on newborn health other than providing po-
tential financial compensation for an injured newborn, a mechanism for
protecting the well being of a developing fetus must be discerned. This is
the heart of the legal dilemma. The only way to prevent harm to the
fetus entails regulating maternal behavior, and such regulation infringes
upon the mother's fundamental constitutional rights to liberty and
privacy. 110
In Roe v. Wade,1 11 the Supreme Court addressed the conflict be-
tween these maternal rights and the state interest in the developing fetus'
life in the abortion context. While the court, in dicta, recognized a state
interest in fetal life, it indicated that it became "compelling" only at the
point of viability, when the fetus is "potentially able to live outside the
mother's womb, albeit with artificial aid."'1 12 Thus, while there may be a
state interest in previable fetal life, it is never strong enough to overcome
the mother's right to bodily integrity. She can choose to terminate the
fetal life she carries at any point prior to viability.
106. Dawn M. Johnsen, Note, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with Women's Con-
stitutional Rights to Liberty, Privacy, and Equal Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599 (1986).
107. See Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138, 142 (D.D.C. 1946).
108. Nelson et al., supra note 64, at 733.
109. Grodin v. Grodin, 102 Mich. App. 396, 400, 301 N.W.2d 869, 870 (1981); Smith v.
Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 364, 157 A.2d 497, 503 (1960).
110. Beginning with Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), the Supreme Court
recognized a constitutionally guaranteed right to privacy. This right protects against state
intrusion in intimate decisions, such as those involving contraception, procreation, marriage,
and family. Additionally, numerous decisions protecting similar autonomy related interests
have been grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment's right to liberty. See LAURENCE TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 775 (2d ed. 1988).
111. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
112. Id. at 160.
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Despite its amorphous nature, Roe's reference to a state interest in
fetal life' 1 3 often is used as the basis for justifying forced medical treat-
ment of pregnant women. 14 This use of Roe's holding is inappropriate,
since Roe v. Wade dealt with a woman's right to terminate her preg-
nancy, not with her duties toward a fetus whom she intended to carry to
term.' 15 An argument founded on Roe v. Wade suffers from the sense of
precariousness and incipient doom that presently surrounds that case.
We may soon be left with a patchwork quilt of common law attempts to
establish a pregnant woman's affirmative duties vis-i-vis her fetus.
One legal commentator, John Robertson, claims that the state inter-
est in fetal life need not be grounded in Roe, but may be seen as the
logical extension of child abuse and neglect laws. Robertson theorizes
that the child abuse laws are evidence of a mother's "legal and moral
duty to bring the child into the world as healthy as is reasonably possi-
ble." 116 "Having decided to use her body to procreate, [a woman] loses
the bodily freedom during pregnancy to harm the child." 117 His argu-
ment is flawed for several reasons. First, as was discussed earlier, preg-
nant women, especially addicted ones, do not necessarily choose to get
pregnant. 18 Furthermore, pregnant addicts often discover they are preg-
nant well beyond the time when abortion is a safe, easy, and affordable
option. More importantly, even if real reproductive choices were avail-
able to women, how could a right as fundamental as autonomy be waived
without notice to the woman? Finally, in making this assertion, Robert-
son ignores the following key facts about child abuse and neglect laws:
they establish no positive obligations, but instead serve only to set a mini-
mum threshold beneath which parents may not fall; and they are based
on well established legal duties owed by parents to their children while
no such tradition of legally enforceable duties exists between a pregnant
women and her fetus.
113. The Supreme Court acknowledged only a limited state interest in fetal life, one suffi-
cient to permit it to ban abortions in the third trimester, except when the woman's health is at
stake. Id. at 163-64.
114. See, eg., In re A.C., 533 A.2d 611 (D.C. 1987); Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County
Hosp. Auth., 247 Ga. 86, 274 S.E.2d 457 (1981).
115. Nancy K. Rhoden, Caesareans and Samaritans, 15 LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE
118, 119 (1987).
116. John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy,
and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REv. 405, 438 (1983).
117. Id. at 442.
118. See supra notes 32-41 and accompanying text.
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To date, courts have refused to apply child abuse laws to claims of
"fetal abuse." 119 However, should the Minnesota law be enforced, the
creation of such a claim will be the result. 120 As of this writing, the
Minnesota law has not been challenged. 121 Moreover, no one at the Min-
nesota state level is tracking the reports that have been filed for restric-
tive measures imposed on pregnant women.122
Because the Minnesota law draws a gender based line, it must repre-
sent an important government function.123 To the extent that laws like
Minnesota's are intended to protect the nonviable fetus from its mother,
the governmental interest is at most tenuous and certainly hard to con-
strue under present law as reflecting an important government function.
Such regulation of women's behavior, therefore, is unconstitutional.
Under present legal precedent, a state seeking to legislate in this area
must limit its scope of protection to viable fetuses or newborns. One
source of authority for such regulation lies in the state's role as parens
patriae, which refers to the "role of state as sovereign and guardian of
persons under legal disability," and requires that the state act to protect
minors in the event that their guardians fail to do so effectively.' 24
However, the extent to which aparenspatriae role enables the state to act
affirmatively to further its interest in viable fetuses is unclear. The state's
interest, as defined by Roe v. Wade, prevents the abortion of a viable fetus
unless the mother's life or health is endangered. 125 Roe does not estab-
lish a state duty to protect or enhance fetal well being beyond this mini-
mal level. For purposes of this analysis, however, I will accept that the
state has a legitimate and important interest in protecting the viable fetus
and the newborn because of its parens patriae role. Given that the Min-
nesota law's purpose derives from this important government function,
the constitutional inquiry then turns on whether the gender based classi-
fication closely serves to achieve that purpose. 126
119. See Reyes v. Superior Court of California, 75 Cal. App. 3d 214, 141 Cal. Rptr. 912
(1977); People v. Stewart, No. M508197 (Cal. Mun. Ct. Feb. 26, 1987).
120. See MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 626.5561 (West Supp. 1992).
121. Telephone Interview with Judith Cook, Staff Counsel, Minnesota Civil Liberties
Union (May 16, 1990).
122. Telephone Interview with Pamela Young, Women's Coordinator, Chemical Depen-
dency Division of Minnesota Department of Human Services (May 16, 1990).
123. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 200 (1976).
124. BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 1003 (6th ed. 1990).
125. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1973).
126. The analysis herein is premised on Craig v. Boren's holding that, in order to be consti-
tutional, the purpose of a law creating a gender based distinction must represent an important
government function, and the gender based distinction must closely serve to achieve that pur-
pose. Craig, 429 U.S. at 200.
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C. Laws Inferring Child Neglect From Suspected Use of Controlled
Substances by Pregnant Women
States are applying child abuse and neglect laws to substance using
pregnant women in two ways, both of which are seen in the Minnesota
law.127 First, the law attempts to protect the fetus by requiring reports
from those who know or suspect that a pregnant woman is using a con-
trolled substance for a nonmedical purpose. Second, it construes a new-
born's positive toxicology screen for a controlled substance as
presumptive evidence of child neglect, and requires that both mother and
child be reported to child protective services. In order to be constitu-
tional, both of these applications must closely serve to achieve the gov-
ernment objective of protecting the viable fetus or newborn's health.
This section will assess the constitutionality of regulating the behavior of
pregnant women. The use of newborn toxicology screens will be ad-
dressed in the section that follows.
The impetus for laws equating maternal drug use with child neglect
arose in response to evidence indicating that drugs ingested by a preg-
nant woman can cross the placenta and may affect the fetus. The extent
to which various substances will harm the fetus is subject to much de-
bate. Some experts claim that even minimal exposure may be harmful,
while others find that many babies survive chronic exposure without evi-
dence of harm. 28 One major difficulty in linking drugs and poor preg-
nancy outcome is the compounding factor of poverty, which is tied to
infant distress and mortality regardless of maternal drug use.
Fetal and newborn health is influenced by a broad matrix of social
and environmental factors, the significance of which are well established
and revealed in United States infant mortality statistics. A 1990 report
by the White House Task Force on Infant Mortality noted that the na-
tional infant mortality rate is higher than in nineteen other countries,
including Hong Kong, Ireland, Italy, and Singapore.1 29 The report also
noted that the infant mortality rate of blacks is twice that of whites. The
task force concluded that, "merely through the application of existing
knowledge," the United States could prevent 10,000 infant deaths and
save 100,000 infants from disabilities such as blindness, deafness, and
mental retardation every year.
130
At work behind these statistics is the disabling influence of poverty.
Poor maternal socioeconomic status obviously implies a higher likeli-
127. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
128. See Cole, supra note 11, at 2666-67.
129. Pear, supra note 46, at Al.
130. Id
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hood of poor nutritional intake, inadequate housing, and insufficient ac-
cess to prenatal care, all of which are considered fundamental for
assuring healthy pregnancies and healthy babies.13' A 1990 Chicago
study of low birth weight, which is the primary risk factor in neonatal
mortality, found that residing in a very low income urban neighborhood
so closely correlated with low birth weight in black women's babies that
even the presence of factors known to enhance fetal and newborn out-
come (such as education, age, and marital status) failed to yield im-
proved health. 13
2
In light of this data, a law attempting to enhance fetal and newborn
well being by identifying pregnant women who use drugs and requiring
them to undergo drug rehabilitation treatment evokes visions of the pro-
verbial tail wagging the dog. Recall that in order to be constitutional,
such a law must "serve important governmental objectives and must be
substantially related to achievement of those objectives."1 33 A brief anal-
ysis reveals not only that existing laws are poorly targeted at the underly-
ing problem, but also that their effect is to hinder, rather than enhance,
fetal and newborn well being.
The Minnesota law requires health care providers to file child ne-
glect reports regarding women they "know or ha[ve] reason to believe"
are pregnant and have "used a controlled substance for a non-medical
purpose during the pregnancy."' 134 The law provides no guidance for
identifying these women, nor does it require screening all patients for
substance abuse. Experts estimate that drug abuse may be the most com-
monly missed diagnosis in obstetrics, being overlooked in as many as
80% of all cases.135 The predictable outcome of this law is to permit, if
not encourage, health providers to report those with whom they associate
drug use because of prevalent stereotypes or prejudicial beliefs. Clear
evidence that this is occurring already exists. Despite the fact that preg-
nant women test positive for controlled substances at relatively equal
rates regardless of race, black women are ten times more likely than
131. PRENATAL CARE: REACHING MOTHERS, REACHING INFANTS, supra note 26, at 4-
5.
132. James W. Collins, Jr. & Richard J. David, The Differential Effect of Traditional Risk
Factors on Infant Birthweight Among Blacks and Whites in Chicago, 80 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH
679, 680 (1990).
133. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
134. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.5561(1) (West Supp. 1992).
135. Ira J. Chasnoff, Drug Use and Women: Establishing a Standard of Care, 562 ANNALS
N.Y. ACAD. Sci. 208, 209 (1989).
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white women to be reported to state agencies for substance use during
pregnancy.
136
The Minnesota law, as structured, presumes conclusively that use of
an illicit substance during pregnancy, even once, constitutes a sufficient
threat to a fetus such that the state is entitled to intervene to correct the
mother's behavior. The law also creates a presumption of neglect, pro-
viding the state with probable cause to remove the child pending investi-
gation. A law premised on this presumption and "substantially related"
to achieving the protection of fetuses and newborns from injury would
pursue parents who use drugs more consistently. The evidence of sys-
temic race bias in administering the law would not be tolerated, and all
pregnant women would need to be tested and reported. More impor-
tantly, new evidence of cocaine's capacity to bind to human sperm would
have to be construed by lawmakers and law enforcers. 137 While there is
not yet absolute proof linking newborns' health problems to paternal co-
caine use, "[tihere is now considerable evidence demonstrating that
males exposed to drugs and other potentially toxic substances prior to
mating have an increased incidence of offspring with abnormal develop-
ment. These findings have been corroborated both in animal and human
studies."1
38
The demand for consistent application of these laws becomes all the
more compelling in view of the fact that laws like Minnesota's focus not
on the child's health status, but instead, on the mother's illegal conduct.
Since the legal consequences to the mother do not vary with the child's
health status, but instead turn on the evidence of her drug use, there is no
rationale to distinguish between the population now monitored by the
law (poor pregnant women of color), and those left virtually untouched
by it (white middle class pregnant women and all men).
Yet, when we try to imagine a law limiting custodial rights of white
middle class men and women (for instance, testing men whose wives or
lovers are pregnant, and forcing those who test positive to undergo sub-
stance abuse treatment-or simply severing paternal custody at birth),
we recognize that such a policy would never be permitted. Laws like
Minnesota's may be politically tolerable only because members of the
white middle class are effectively exempt.
Additional evidence that these laws are not substantially related to
the government's purpose lies in the severe shortage of treatment facili-
136. Chasnoff et al., Illicit Drug Use, supra note 15, at 1204.
137. See Ricardo A. Yazigi et al., Demonstration of Specific Binding of Cocaine to Human
Spermatozoa, 266 JAMA 1956 (1991).
138. Id. at 1956.
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ties for those women who are addicts. There simply are not enough
treatment programs available, and the small minority of treatment pro-
grams that are willing to accept pregnant addicts are unlikely to provide
the full range of services they need. 139 The Minnesota law ignores this
shortage so completely that it includes in its law a provision for "emer-
gency admission" (i.e., civil commitment) of those pregnant women who
refuse or fail the "voluntary" treatment made available to them. 14°
Involuntary commitment for pregnant women who refuse drug
abuse treatment services is extremely troublesome on both due process
and equal protection grounds.141 Moreover, this law is not limited to
pregnant addicts and, thus, could be applied as a form of punishment to
pregnant women not needing treatment. This policy appears even more
ridiculous in view of data demonstrating that the health status of incar-
cerated pregnant women is so poor that both the mother and the fetus
are likely to suffer as a result of such confinement. 142 Given the paucity
of adequate treatment for pregnant addicts in either the public or private
sector, it is hard to imagine that state run mandatory programs will re-
ceive sufficient funding to meet the demanding and comprehensive health
care needs of this population.
In light of the foregoing, it seems evident that a law requiring health
care practitioners to report pregnant women suspected of using drugs is,
at best, remotely related to preserving or enhancing fetal health. The
only plausible positive effect of such a law would be to scare women out
of using drugs by threatening them with the loss of autonomy and the
eventual loss of child custody. Yet those women who are addicts, and
whose drug use therefore poses the greatest risk of harm to their fetuses,
are the least likely to be able to quit in response to a threat.143
A more predictable outcome of laws like Minnesota's will be to cre-
ate a profound disincentive for pregnant drug users to seek health care.
Since the laws charge health care practitioners with monitoring their pa-
tients, they drive a wedge between the provider and the patient. While
this same conflict of interest is present in other circumstances such as
139. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text, regarding prenatal care, child care,
parenting skills, self esteem, support, etc.
140. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.5561(2) (West Supp. 1992).
141. See, &g., Batey & Garcia, supra note 14, at 99.
142. See Cole, supra note 11, at 2667 ("Pregnant women in jail are routinely subject to
conditions that are hazardous to fetal health, such as gross overcrowding, 24-hour lock up
with no access to exercise or fresh air, exposure to tuberculosis, measles, and hepatitis, and a
generally filthy and unsanitary environment.").
143. Recall that as early as 1962, the Supreme Court acknowledged that addiction was an
illness and should not be treated as a crime. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962).
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mandatory reporting of suspected child abuse, its operation is different in
this case because prenatal care, unlike emergency treatment of injured
children, is already foregone by so many women because of lack of ac-
cess. A policy that drives women away from care, when the only estab-
lished means of enhancing maternal and fetal well being is
comprehensive health care, cannot be construed as closely related to the
government purpose of protecting fetal and newborn well being.
Therefore, a law requiring the testing, reporting, and possible incar-
ceration of pregnant women who use drugs fails to promote the govern-
ment purpose of protecting fetal and newborn well being. Because such a
law cannot be shown to be substantially related to the government pur-
pose, the state lacks justification to support its overt discrimination on
the basis of sex. The law is therefore unconstitutional.
D. Newborns, Positive Toxicology Screens, and Presumptive Neglect
Another method by which states have applied child abuse and ne-
glect laws to the problem of perinatal use of controlled substances is test-
ing newborns suspected of having been exposed to such substances in
utero. Rather than using the Minnesota law's provision requiring new-
born testing as an example, 144 I will focus on an essentially identical Illi-
nois law about which more information is available. As discussed in Part
III.A. above, in August 1989, the Illinois state legislature passed a law
requiring notification of the state DCFS whenever a newborn's blood or
urine tests positive for an illicit substance.145 The law does not require
that newborns be tested. Therefore, its effect is limited by the frequency
with which health care practitioners fail to diagnose maternal drug use,
as well as by the discretionary use of the tests.
The Illinois law is premised on a belief that a newborn whose
mother ingested drugs while pregnant likely will be neglected in the fu-
ture. The law thus permits the state to seize custody preemptively,
rather than waiting for the child to be injured. 146 There are two underly-
ing assumptions which must be explored in assessing whether laws like
Illinois' closely relate to protecting fetal or child well being: First, these
laws assume that toxicology screens are an adequate proxy for establish-
ing a presumptive case of child neglect; second, they assume that a child
144. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.5562(2) (West Supp. 1992).
145. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, para. 2053 (Smith-Hurd 1988). See supra notes 66-71 and
accompanying text for a discussion of this statute's operation.
146. See In re Baby X, 97 Mich. App. 111, 115, 293 N.W.2d 736, 739 (1980) (providing a
similar rationale in a common law case).
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is better protected in state or temporary foster custody than with a natu-
ral mother who has used a controlled substance.
Drawing an inference of child neglect from a newborn's positive tox-
icology screen initially might seem to be justifiable; after all, the test re-
sult proves that the mother ingested a controlled substance while
pregnant. However, a more thorough consideration of what the test does
and does not reveal about both maternal and child welfare demonstrates
the inappropriateness of this inference. While a newborn's positive toxi-
cology screen may result from a pregnant woman's chronic use of an
illicit substance, a single exposure to a drug also can result in a positive
screen. While a woman who uses an illicit substance once or twice dur-
ing pregnancy may not have exercised good judgment, it is not clear that
poor judgment constitutes grounds for revoking custody. Even though
loss of custody presumably would be temporary in these cases, such a
loss is not warranted under the child abuse and neglect statutes unless
these women pose a threat to their children. Ms. Judith Rosen, the San
Diego attorney who defended Pamela Rae Stewart, 147 explains that, "one
positive test 'is only a snapshot at one point in time .... [It] doesn't
indicate [the mother's] ability to parent, the extent of her drug abuse or
the extent of her motivation to rehabilitate if she is an addict.' "148
Moreover, the policy of severing custody during the pendency of the in-
formal investigation actually harms mother and child by eliminating the
possibility of breast-feeding and by impeding mother-child bonding.
149
While one problem with reporting laws based on newborns' positive
toxicology screens is that they catch women who may not pose signifi-
cant threats to their children, perhaps a more striking problem is that
they fail to identify many whose behavior clearly threatens their children.
This problem is illustrated by the fact that the reporting laws address
maternal use only of illicit substances, and ignore the tremendous body
of evidence regarding the toxic fetal effects of alcohol and cigarettes. 150
Therefore, the laws offer no protection to those newborns whose mothers
are addicted to lethal, but licit, substances.
A more revealing omission is seen in the law's focus on maternal
drug use. The screen is not designed to identify babies who have been
injured by maternal drug use; rather, it is designed to identify babies with
147. See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Stewart case.
148. Rorie Sherman, Keeping Babies Free of Drugs, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 16, 1989, at 1.
149. Interview with Dr. Lori Walsh, Chicago area Pediatrician, in Chicago, Ill. (June 9,
1991).
150. See Sam S. Balisy, Note, Maternal Substance Abuse: The Need to Provide Legal Pro-
tection for the Fetus, 60 S. CAL. L. REv. 1209, 1210-18 (1987); see also James C. Byrd et al.,
Passive Smoking: A Review of Medical and Legal Issues, 79 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 209 (1989).
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a drug using caretaker who is likely to deprive them or abuse them.
Since both parents could deprive or abuse a child, information should be
sought on male parents as well as female ones. Since the trigger for state
intervention is contact with health care providers, all health care provid-
ers should be required to screen all patients of childbearing capacity for
the presence of illicit drugs. All individuals who test positive should be
required to show proof that their partners are not pregnant and that they
do not have children. If they cannot do so, the state will need to take
temporary custody of their children and investigate the household to see
if the child's best interests are served by remaining there. Furthermore,
this policy must apply to parents with a child of any age, as children of
all ages can be abused or neglected by drug using parents. Before dis-
missing this suggestion as absurd, recognize that it is perfectly consistent
with the policy underlying the newborn toxicology screening laws. The
reason it would never be pursued is not because of logistical difficulties,
but rather because of its infringement on male autonomy.
A toxicology screen reveals only that the child was exposed to an
unknown quantity of an illicit substance at some point while in utero. It
does little to estimate the potential harm a newborn faces from its home
environment. It fails to reveal a host of additional factors with far
greater bearing on fetal and child well being, such as the family's access
to medical care, housing, and nutrition. As such, it constitutes a poor,
clumsy, and inadequate instrument for predicting harm to children, and
is only remotely related to the government's goal of protecting child wel-
fare. Treating maternal drug use as the principal factor in determining
child well being so ignores the glaring and devastating problems posed by
poverty that it raises the question whether these laws are simply vehicles
for punishing mothers rather than for protecting children.
1 51
Finally, since newborn toxicology screens are not mandatory, but
rather are administered at the discretion of the health care provider, the
same racial bias that generates ten times more prenatal substance abuse
reports against pregnant black women than white women is left un-
checked.1 52 Racism, whether benign or purposeful, is causing black chil-
151. For example, experts have estimated that an appalling 17% of all urban children in
the country have ingested potentially dangerous levels of lead. Maura Dolan, Study Finds
Perilous Level of Lead in 20% of Children, L. A. TIMES, June 2, 1989, § 1, at 1. Additionally
WIC, a government program which subsidizes the costs of nutrition for women, infants and
children, thus averting thousands of potential health problems, has suffered continual funding
cutbacks which result in many women and children being removed from the program. Food
Program for Poor Women, Children Cut Back, REUTERS NEWS SERV., June 27, 1990.
152. See supra text accompanying note 23.
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dren to be ripped away from their mothers, thus systematically
dismantling the black community under the guise of child protection.
53
Even were the toxicology screen a perfectly sensitive test, and even
were it administered across the population in a nonracist manner, and
even were it based on a valid distinction between maternal and paternal
drug use, it would still not be clear that equating maternal addiction with
child neglect and severing custody are helpful, let alone closely related,
to protecting and promoting child welfare. As the remarks in Part III of
this Article indicated, viewing the nation's foster care system as a safe
haven for children is naive, for it is no longer the case that the care pro-
vided to children in state custody is, in fact, protective.
One would hope that the state removes from maternal custody only
those newborns whose mothers' addictions are so debilitating as to pre-
vent them from caring for their children 54 and whose extended families
are unable to substitute as caretakers. However, stories like that of The-
resa L.155 raise the suspicion that custody determination decisions may
be made on irrational, subjective grounds.
More troubling than the unjustifiable temporary severing of child
custody from women who indeed are capable of caring for their chil-
dren-if it is possible to imagine anything more troubling than such in-
justice-is the effect of the system on women who are addicts and who
will need help if they are to regain custody of their children. These
mothers essentially have been abandoned by the state, despite its mission
to keep foster care a temporary solution for families in crisis and despite
its duty to work toward reuniting families.156 Because these women lack
access to drug abuse treatment programs, there is little hope that they
will be able to take the steps toward recovery needed to stabilize their
own lives, let alone regain custody. Instead, they are returned to the
same situations from which they came, and having been given no help in
accessing services that might empower them to change their situations,
there is no reason to believe that they will not become pregnant again.
153. I am thankful to Patricia Williams, Professor of Law at the University of Wisconsin,
Madison, for her insight into this aspect of the child abuse and neglect paradox.
154. This is not to suggest that all children of addicted mothers should stay in the home. I
simply question the wisdom of a policy that separates children from those capable and willing
mothers who happen to have used controlled substances. The problems suffered by children of
drug abusing parents are numerous and real, but they must be compared to the significant
harms faced by children living in foster care. See supra notes 81-90 and accompanying text.
Moreover, it is interesting to note that in all the years of studies on alcoholism's effect on a
family, no one has ever suggested removing all children from homes of alcoholic parents.
155. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
156. Bardon, supra note 81, at Al.
DRUGS, PREGNANCY, AND LAWMarch 1992]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
The inevitable effect of the Illinois law was made clear to me in my
visit to the Columbus-Maryville Children's Reception Center,1 57 where
Chicago babies who screen positive are held pending foster care place-
ment. In the nine months that the facility has been operating, it has
housed over three hundred newborns. Yet, during that time there have
been only six visits from family members.158 Sister Honora, the facility's
director, expressed her confusion and dismay over this breakdown in
family ties. When I asked her why more families didn't visit, she re-
marked: "I refuse to believe that so many of these families just don't care
about their babies." 159 Instead, she thinks that a combination of igno-
rance, fear, and logistics combine to deter visiting. Many of the babies'
mothers still are using drugs and may spend much of their time pursuing
their habits. Depending both on the extent to which she abuses drugs
and on her skill at working through the bureaucratic morass of the state
child placement agency, a mother may be totally unaware of her child's
location. Likewise, extended family members may find it exceedingly dif-
ficult to obtain the placement agency's cooperation in tracking down a
child in state custody. 16°
Additionally, the publicity surrounding the issue of criminalizing
perinatal drug abuse causes mothers a tremendous amount of fear. Sister
Honora suspects that many of the mothers, especially those still using
drugs, do not come to visit for fear they will be arrested.
1 61
Logistical problems also must be taken into consideration. Colum-
bus-Maryville is on Chicago's North Side, yet most of the babies in the
facility come from homes located on the city's South or West Sides.
Therefore, visiting the facility, especially if travelling by public transpor-
tation, may entail a trip of over an hour and require several transfers.
Add to this the fact that the visitor may be the caretaker for additional
children, and it becomes apparent why there are not more family visits.
It is simply too difficult.
Legally, the important question arising from this backdrop is
whether the policy of testing newborns and seizing custody of those with
controlled substances in their systems is closely related to the state pur-
pose of protecting child well being. There are several reasons for finding
that it is not. In addition to being an overly broad and crude proxy for
discerning children at risk of neglect, this policy is applied in an arbitrary






and racist fashion against women and children of color. The system can-
not be viewed as protecting newborns. At best, it takes them from one
potentially harmful situation and places them in another.
162
Anyone familiar with this issue knows that there are mothers who
are so consumed by their addictions that they are unable to engage in
even a minimally responsible level of childrearing. I do not maintain that
newborns should be left with such mothers. However, the state interest
in protecting child well being requires that the state identify these
mothers with far greater specificity and do more for them than remove
their children to institutions, thereby severing ties with extended family
and leaving the children suspended in a world of temporary caretakers.
E. Gender Discrimination: From Difference Analysis to Dominance
Analysis
Though the asserted state interest in addressing the problems deriv-
ing from perinatal drug abuse is to protect the health of fetuses and ba-
bies, it is apparent from the foregoing that applying child neglect laws to
pregnant women will not accomplish this. Instead, these laws simultane-
ously punish women who use drugs during pregnancy and jeopardize fe-
tal and newborn well being. The only plausible justification for
subjecting women, but not men, to these laws is a belief that women have
a unique capacity to harm a fetus by ingesting a controlled substance
during pregnancy. As I already have demonstrated, that assumption is
false; in fact, the developing fetus may be harmed by many external vari-
ables, including the environment (x-rays, battery acid, maternal exposure
to cigarette smoke), the mother's nutritional status and her access to
health care, paternal alcohol consumption, and possibly paternal drug
use as well. 163 Furthermore, even if maternal drug use was significantly
more damaging to the fetus than any other factor, that evidence would
not, in and of itself, justify the differential application of these laws to
women only unless the laws closely served to achieve the important gov-
ernment function of protecting fetal and newborn well being. As already
demonstrated, they do not.164
More importantly, the focus on biological differences between wo-
men and men obscures the purpose of these laws entirely. The laws are
supposed to be about protecting the health of babies whose health is af-
fected by a broad variety of social and environmental factors.
162. See supra note 83 and accompanying text (discussing abuse of children in state
custody).
163. See supra notes 6, 137 and accompanying text, and note 151.
164. See supra Part IV.B.
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The tendency to justify differential treatment for men and women on
biological bases is inherent in traditional Fourteenth Amendment dis-
crimination analysis. As Catharine MacKinnon explains, this analysis is
premised on a "sameness/difference" approach, the general thrust of
which is that, "to the extent that women are no different from men, wo-
men deserve what men have." 165 In application to biological differences,
this analysis reasons that "because there is no man to set a standard from
which women's treatment is a deviation, there is no sex discrimination,
only a sex difference." 166 MacKinnon writes:
What sex equality law fails to notice is that men's differences from
women are equal to women's differences from men. Yet the sexes are
not equally situated in society with regard to their relative differences.
Hierarchy of power produces real as well as fantasied differences, dif-
ferences that are also inequalities. The differences are equal. The ine-
qualities, rather obviously, are not.
167
MacKinnon suggests an alternative approach to traditional gender
discrimination analysis: the "dominance" approach. 16 Her model is de-
rived from the race discrimination cases of the 1960s, which were "based
on the realization that the condition of Blacks... was not fundamentally
a matter of rational or irrational differentiation on the basis of race but
was fundamentally a matter of white supremacy, under which racial dif-
ferences became invidious as a consequence."
' 169
The crucial distinction between the difference approach and the
dominance approach lies in the focus of judicial inquiry. A court analyz-
ing a statute from a dominance perspective will focus not on the inten-
tions of the state actors, but instead on the impact their actions have on
particular social groups. This approach was central to the Supreme
Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 170 which focused on
segregation's effect on the "hearts and minds" of black children.171 The
decision, according to commentator Laurence Tribe, reflects the Court's
understanding "that racial segregation in public schools and other facili-
ties in fact subjugates blacks, despite its appearance of symmetry, be-
cause it stands for and reenforces white supremacy-a regime we now
165. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 220
(1989) [hereinafter MAcKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY].
166. Id. at 223.
167. Id. at 224-25.
168. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND
LAW 42 (1987).
169. Id.
170. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
171. Id. at 494.
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recognize to be utterly at odds with the concept of 'equal protection of
the laws.' ",172
Essentially, the dominance approach positions gender as an inequal-
ity first, then analyzes the socially constructed rules which purportedly
derive from sex differences in terms of their tendency to keep gender
inequality in place.173 Dominance analysis begins by examining women's
reality, or what I have called the context in which women live. From
this perspective, the creation of "individual rights" in law is examined in
terms of their effect on women's lives. In this manner, laws which under
traditional analysis appear to be gender neutral emerge as a discrimina-
tory means of perpetuating the subordination of women.174
An excellent example of this approach is seen in Sylvia Law's arti-
cle, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 175 in which she advocates a re-
vised equal protection analysis of abortion-restrictive regulation. The
article documents the ways in which pregnancy and childbirth pro-
foundly shape women's health, mobility, and independence, and shows
how women are uniquely and significantly disadvantaged because they
alone bear these burdens.
176
After demonstrating how abortion-restrictive regulations implicate
equality concerns, Law posits a legal standard which acknowledges wo-
men's subordinated position in society and which is intended to limit
state actions which enforce that inequality:
[L]aws governing reproductive biology should be scrutinized by courts
to ensure that (1) the law has no significant impact in perpetuating
either the oppression of women or culturally imposed sex role con-
straints on individual freedom or (2) if the law has this impact, it is
justified as the best means of serving a compelling state purpose.
Given how central state regulation of biology has been to the subjuga-
tion of women, the normal presumption of constitutionality is inappro-
priate and the state should bear the burden of justifying its rule in
relation to either proposition.'
77
As applied to laws addressing perinatal drug use, dominance analy-
sis might proceed along the following lines. For reasons ranging from
gendered norms in sexuality to relative economic powerlessness, wo-
men--especially those who are addicts-have little control over the cir-
cumstances of their sexual relations with men. 178 This lack of control
172. TRIBE, supra note 110, at 1477-78.
173. Id at 42.
174. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY, supra note 165, at 243-45.
175. Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 955 (1984).
176. Id. at 955-56.
177. Id. at 1008-09; see id. at 1016-28 (applying this standard to abortion regulation).
178. See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
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extends to the use of contraception. 179 As a result, they have limited
control over their fertility and often experience unplanned or unwanted
pregnancies. If a woman wishes to terminate her pregnancy, she will find
access to abortion limited by cost and location. This is especially true if
she is beyond the first trimester of pregnancy, if she lives in a rural area,
or if she is a minor.180
Pregnant women who are addicted to drugs require a broad spec-
trum of health care services ranging from prenatal care to drug abuse
treatment, all of which are extremely costly, if they are available at all.181
More than one in four women of reproductive age are without health
insurance for maternity care, and two-thirds of these women lack any
medical insurance whatsoever.182 Poor pregnant addicts lack access to
treatment not only because they lack the financial means to obtain treat-
ment, but also because providers are reluctant to treat this population.
1 83
States applying child abuse and neglect laws to pregnant women
who use drugs claim they are acting to protect fetal and newborn lives.
Yet, such recognition of fetal and newborn rights implicitly diminishes
women's autonomy. Applying Sylvia Law's proposed standard for anal-
ysis of gender based laws premised on reproductive differences between
the sexes, the state must show either that the law does not perpetuate
"the oppression of women or culturally imposed sex role constraints on
individual freedom," or that the law "is the best means for meeting a
compelling state purpose."
1 84
Laws like Minnesota's, which require testing and reporting of preg-
nant women and newborn babies guspected of exposure to drugs, plainly
contribute to the oppression of women. It subjects all women to the
scrutiny of others, to the possibility of random drug (and pregnancy)
testing by state officials, and to the loss of privacy entailed by such meas-
ures. It imposes sex role constraints on individual freedom both at a
concrete level, by incarcerating pregnant women who use drugs,185 and
179. See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
180. Tamara Lewin, Abortions Harder to Get in Rural Areas of Nation, N.Y. TIMEs, June
28, 1990, at A18.
181. In addition to shortages of substance abuse treatment programs, many areas of the
country are experiencing severe shortages of obstetricians. Hatlie, supra note 60, at 584 (not-
ing that "67 counties in Georgia, 28 in Alabama and 19 in Colorado lack a single physician
provider of obstetric care").
182. PRENATAL CARE: REACHING MOTHERS, REACHING INFANTS, supra note 26, at 56.
183. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
184. Law, supra note 175, at 1017.
185. See, e.g., United States v. Vaughn, 117 Daily Wash. Rptr. 441, 442 (D.C. Super. Ct.
1989) (cocaine addicted pregnant woman, convicted of forging a check, was incarcerated for
the term of her pregnancy; presiding judge acknowledged that ordinarily the defendant would
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in an abstract sense, by perpetuating the myth that the health of
newborns is solely a function of maternal restraint during pregnancy.
Even if a law oppresses women, Professor Law's test will permit it if
it is the best means of meeting a compelling state purpose. As my earlier
analysis indicates, these laws do not meet the intermediate standard of
being "closely related to an important state interest." 18 6 Therefore, they
cannot pass this strict review. It is by no means clear that the state pos-
sesses a compelling interest in fetal life. Even if it did, these laws are far
from the best means of protecting that interest. As discussed above, the
effects of these laws will be: to drive pregnant women away from treat-
ment that might help both themselves and the babies they carry; to sepa-
rate children from their mothers; to dump the children into the
bureaucratic morass of the foster care system; and to leave the mothers
without access to the services they need to be reunited with their
children.187
The present policy, one of polarizing maternal and fetal rights and
attempting to tip the balance in favor of protecting the fetus, not only
leads to pernicious outcomes, such as women avoiding the few health
care services available to them, but also operates to perpetuate gender
inequality. Women remain outside the health care system, vulnerable to
a cycle of unwanted pregnancies, state regulation of their bodies during
pregnancy, and the loss of their children or families after delivery. These
results are so removed from the asserted state goals that they render the
laws irrational and therefore unconstitutional under any standard of
review.
V. Concluding Remarks: Notes for the Development of a
Healthy Alternative
Over fifteen years ago, Adrienne Rich observed that, "[t]he value of
a woman's life would appear to be contingent on her being pregnant or
newly delivered."1 88 To the extent that society's sudden obsession with
pregnant addicts can be called a "value," Rich is correct. The problem
of treating addiction in women was largely ignored until evidence
have received a sentence of probation for the misdemeanor); see also Key Case on Pregnant
Women and Drug Abuse Going to Trial, NATIoN's HEALTH, Oct. 1991, at 1, 20 (discussing
the Johnson case in Florida). Regarding criminal penalties generally, see Hoffman, supra note
13, at 33, 34.
186. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 200 (1976).
187. Examples of such services include health care, appropriate substance abuse treatment
programs, and child care.
188. ADRIENNE RICH, OF WOMAN BORN 169 (1976).
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showed that the harmful substances they were ingesting crossed the pla-
cental boundary. In other words, no attempt was made to develop treat-
ment programs for women until society became worried about female
addicts who were mothers. "In 1979, after a half decade of encouraging
treatment programs to recognize and provide for the specific needs of
addicted women, [the National Institute on Drug Addiction] surveyed
those drug treatment programs which described themselves as specifi-
cally geared to female addicts." 189 Nationwide, only twenty-five such
programs were found; of these, more than half reported no provision of
gynecologic care, and three-quarters gave no contraceptive counseling. 190
The logical alternative to addressing the problem of perinatal drug
use through an ineffective, unconstitutional policy based on threats and
coercion is to encourage addicted women to obtain treatment. But treat-
ment that truly is designed to meet the needs of this population is only
now being developed. In order to discuss the content of an appropriate
or progressive policy I return to the question I raised at the end of Part
II: Does treatment work? For pregnant addicts, this question cannot be
answered with certainty because aside from several excellent, small scale
programs we have yet to try it.19 However, some consistent findings
arising from research on the success of standard male oriented treatment
programs may be of use in designing treatment for addicted women.
Most treatment evaluation research focuses on alcohol addiction.
The highest reported success rates among alcohol treatment programs
are found in multicomponent programs. These integrate traditional Al-
coholics Anonymous therapy with occupational and recreational ther-
apy, individual and group counseling, medication, and after care.
192
One such program, the Hazelden program in Minnesota, shows 43% of
the original patient population abstinent at one year post-treatment.
193
189. Chavkin, supra note 58, at 485.
190. Id.
191. As for evaluations of women in treatment, Beth Reed notes that "(t)here is still very
little... that examines the outcomes associated with different types of services, or whether...
matching women's needs with particular types of services or programs produces better out-
comes ...." Reed, supra note 27, at 152. Furthermore, in studies of drug dependent treat-
ment models, "[w]omen were either ignored, combined with men for data analysis, assumed to
be the opposite of men, or their results were so puzzling that they were called unpredictable
and thus, not interpreted." Id. But note that the Hutzel Recovery Center, Dr. Ira Chasnoff,
and others are reporting success in programs that integrate prenatal care, child care, housing,
and drug rehabilitation. See Kathleen Teltsch, In Detroit, a Drug Recovery Center that
Welcomes the Pregnant Addict, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1990, at A14; see also Interview with Dr.
Ira J. Chasnoff, supra note 56.
192. PRENATAL CARE: REACHING MOTHERS, REACHING INFANTS, supra note 26, at
185.
193. Id.
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Although it was not directed at women, and certainly did not include
pregnant alcoholics among its population, Hazelden's attempt to meet
the addict's full range of needs through a multicomponent approach is
consistent with the evidence regarding the diverse needs of women
addicts.
A second significant finding is that motivation to quit plays a key
role in addiction recovery.19 4 Because the drug abuse treatment commu-
nity "has no idea how to work with women (or any patients) not ready to
acknowledge their substance abuse problems," 195 Reed advocates social
changes that would at least facilitate entry into treatment, if not motivate
a desire to end dependency.
Among the barriers women face to entering treatment are the lack
of economic resources and the burden of child related responsibilities.
1 9 6
In addition, there are barriers to engagement in treatment, primarily aris-
ing out of the psychosocial make-up of drug dependent women.197 Fi-
nally, chances of long term abstinence and an improved quality of life are
hindered by the lack of meaningful roles available to women upon com-
pletion of the program. Therefore, Reed would include assertiveness
training and skills for autonomous living, in addition to the general voca-
tional training and therapy provided by the treatment program.
198
A cynic might respond to all of this by claiming that there is no
reason to believe that treatment, even if perfectly tailored to meet wo-
men's needs, will work. While the cynic may be correct, this observation
does not really take us anywhere. The fact remains that, unless society
wishes to pursue a sterilization campaign, no other "solution"-neither
criminalization nor child abuse and neglect laws-addresses the fact that
addicted women of reproductive age will continue to use drugs and will
continue to bear children.
Ever since the story of Pamela Rae Stewart made headlines, calls for
draconian measures against pregnant women who behave in a manner
that is less than altruistic have proliferated. It is as if these pregnant
194. For example, recent data from smoking cessation programs show that much higher
success rates exist among those who quit smoking on their own (48%) as opposed to through
cessation programs (24%). Michael C. Fiore et al., Methods Used to Quit Smoking in the US.:
Do Cessation Programs Help?, 263 JAMA 2760, 2765 (1990); see also PRENATAL CARE:
REACHING MOTHERS, REACHING INFANTS, supra note 26, at 193 (discussing patient motiva-
tion as a factor in successful alcohol treatment).
195. Telephone Interview with Beth Reed, supra note 33.
196. Beth G. Reed, Drug Misuse and Dependency in Women: The Meaning and Implica-
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women had somehow betrayed society, when in reality it is society that
has betrayed them.
The image of the pregnant drug user as a betrayer, as one whose
interests are diametrically opposed to those of her fetus, as one who will
intentionally harm her fetus unless stopped by the state, surely is a seduc-
tive one. It requires only that we purge society of these bad women,
rather than forcing us to address the more troubling issue of why drug
abuse is so prevalent in this country. However, it is also a pernicious
image. To the extent that such an image drives public response, laws and
policies will continue to discourage pregnant addicts from seeking out
the medical care they so desperately need. Therefore, it is incumbent
upon those of us familiar with the problems women face generally and
with their lack of access to prenatal care and drug abuse treatment to
make our voices heard.
